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$ 20.01 Introduction 
[I] The Concept of Owning Together 
Blackstone has defined the hallmark of private property as 
the ability to exclude others from use of property, subject 
only to the rules of law governing society.' When parties 
"own property together," the right to exclude is modified: the 
co-owners cannot exclude each other, but they may protect 
the property and exclude non-members of the "owning" 
community, primarily through trespass laws. Although the 
form of "owning together" may vary, concurrent ownership is 
an all-inclusive term. Once there are two concurrent owners, 
a tale of two owners may begin.2 
2 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *2 and *134. 
General treatments of concurrent ownership and mineral development include 
the following, in alphabetical order: Owen L. Anderson & Michael D. Cuda, 'The 
Nonconsenting Cotenant in Oil and Gas Development: The Oil Patch Version of the 
'Little Red Hen'," 12 Eastern Min. L. Znst. 16-1 (1991); Frank Erisman & Elizabeth 
Jennings Dalton, 'Multi-Party Ownership of Minerals-Some Real Property 
Consequences of Joint Mineral Development," 25 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Znst. 7-1 (1979); 
Richard W. Hemingway, The Law of Oil and Gas (3d ed. 1991); Will A. Knight, 
'Cotenancy-A Sometimes Unhbly Alliance," 33rd Oil & Gas Znst. 225 (Sw. L. Fdn. 
1982); 1 Eugene Kuntz, Law of Oil and Gas $3 5.1 - 5.12 (1987); Eugene Kuntz, 
'Gas Balancing Rights and Remedies in the Absence of a Balancing Agreement," 35 
Rocky Mt. Min. L. Znst. 13-1 (1989); Patrick H. Martin, 'The Gas Balancing 
Agreement: What, When, Why, and How," 36 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Znst. 13-1 (1990); 
Cheryl Outerbridge, 'Missing and Unknown Mineral Owners," 25 Rocky Mt. Min. 
15. Inst. 20-1 (1979); Homer J. Penn, 'Cotenancy Problems: Is the Gas Balancing 
Concurrent ownership originates in several ways. A common 
genesis is through marriage: a husband and wife seek to have 
their lives arranged as "one." A similarly common, albeit less 
celebratory reason for concurrent ownership, arises from death. 
Either through intestacy or through devise, heirs or children 
are oRen left property to "share and share alike." A final 
common rationale for concurrent ownership is more peculiar to 
the mineral industry. The presence or absence of minerals is 
oRen speculative. To spread risks and increase revenue 
possibilities, investors may buy partial mineral interests in 
several tracts. Shares of minerals can also compensate geolo- 
gists or other  collaborator^.^ 
To fully understand the concurrent ownership problems that 
may confront the oil and gas developer, three major types of 
concurrent ownership must be addre~sed .~  In the mineral 
investment realm, most concurrent ownership is as tenants in 
common. This mode of ownership therefore will receive 
primary attention. In distinguishing cotenancy from the other 
major forms of ownership, four attributes should be compared: 
(1) the right to alienate inter vivos by giR or sale, (2) the right 
to devise by will operable at  death, (3) the right to pass the 
property a t  death through the relevant jurisdiction's intestacy 
statutes, and (4) the ability to end the relationship and own 
the property individually. The cotenant has all four rights. The 
remaining two of the big three forms of concurrent ownership 
Agreement the Answer?" 33 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 18-1 (1987); James L. Shepherd, 
Jr., "Problems Incident to Joint Ownership of the Oil and Gas Leasehold Estate," 
5th Oil & Gas Inst. 215 (Sw. L. Fdn. 1954); Ernest E. Smith, "Gas Marketing by Co- 
Owners: Disproportionate Sales, Gas Imbalances and Lessors' Claims to Royalties," 
39 Baylor L. Rev. 366 (1987); W.L. Summers, Oil and Gas (2d ed. 1954); and 2 
Howard R. Williams & Charles J. Meyers, Oil and Gas Law $4 502-10 (Martin & 
Kramer ed., 1996). 
30wners may also seek to cash in on a boom by granting multiple interests. See 
Outerbridge, supra note 2, at 20-3 to 20-5. 
4~ommuni ty  property, tenancy in coparcenary, and tenancy in partnership are 
not discussed. For concurrent ownership generally, see, 4 Thompson on Real 
Property, Thomas Edition 1-189 and 313-46 (David A. Thomas ed., 1994); John E. 
Cribbet & Corwin W .  Johnson, Principles of the Law of Property 86-107 (3d ed. 
1989); and Roger A. Cunningham, William B. Stoebuck & Dale A. Whitman, The 
Law of Property 187-246 (2d ed. 1993). 
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that often impact title opinions are joint tenancy and tenancy 
by the entirety. These have only some of the incidents of a 
cotenancy. Both joint tenancy and tenancy by the entirety 
provide for a right of survivorship, which eliminates both the 
second and third attributes of a cotenancy. One fundamental 
difference between these two forms, however, is that a tenancy 
by the entirety may only be held by a husband and wife but 
anyone may be a joint tenant with anyone chosen. 
[21 Inherent Problems with Concurrent Ownership 
Because no two people view the world identically, concurrent 
owners may not agree on property development. As a judge 
astutely noted, "Two . . . cannot plow the same furrow."5 Each 
owner could rush to reach his or her favored outcome. This 
leads to the phenomenon referred to as the "Tragedy of the 
Commons.'* Externalities may increase as each concurrent 
owner attempts to maximize his or her self-interest without 
considering the ultimate impact on the property's value. 
Moreover, if anyone desired to purchase or otherwise develop 
the concurrently owned property, transaction costs increase if 
all co-owners must concur. 
To clarify these principles, consider the consequences of a 
bequest by an Uncle Jed of a fishing cabin to his two favorite 
relatives, the siblings Avery and Lou, as tenants in common. 
It was the best of times; i t  was the worst of times. The loss of 
Uncle Jed was sad, but the thought of the cabin was pleasing. 
Nevertheless, some discontent would creep in over use of the 
cabin. And then, to unashamedly intermix cultural icons, the 
James L. Shepherd, discord would increase as "up through the ground came some 
3 Leasehold Estate," bubbling crude, oil that is, black gold."' 
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b a r r e t t  Hardin, 'The Tragedy of the Commons," 162 Science 1243 (1968) (when 
pasturage is owned in common, no individual herder has incentive to limit cattle 
grazed because others would consume forage if herder did not; decreased productivi- 
ty may result). 
7 " ~ h e  Ballad of Jed Clampett." 
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Ei 20.02[:1.] MINERAL LAW INSTITUTE 
O 20.02 Tenants-in-Common and Non-Mineral 
Development 
[I] Basic Ownership Rights 
Under current law, a deed or gift to one or more parties 
without additional verbiage is presumed to be a tenancy in 
common. Avery and Lou, as tenants in common, each have an 
"undivided" right to the whole. There is no line down the 
center of the fishing cabin as  might be placed in the center of 
a room two squabbling children share. For a tenancy in 
common to exist, only one unity is required. The cotenants 
must have a unity of possession; they do not have to have the 
same shares in the property or have received their rights from 
the same source. It is essentially a relationship between 
A tenancy in common has been defined as a joint interest in 
which there is unity of possession, but separate and distinct 
titles. The relationship exists where property is held by 
several distinct titles by unity of possession, and is not an 
estate but a relation between persons, the only essential 
being a possessory right, as to which all are entitled to 
equal use and possession.8 
The cotenants, however, can treat their interests in the 
property as separate interests. Each tenant in common may 
sell his or her interest or even subdivide it. At the death of 
either sibling, if not earlier sold, the cotenant's interest passes 
to a devisee by will or to the dead sibling's heir by intestacy. 
Nevertheless, both Avery and Lou during their co-ownership 
must let the other have possession of the cabin. Neither one 
can "oust" the other. Ouster is a denial of the right to share the 
property. Ouster, however, is difficult to define. Changing locks 
may not be sufficient to create an ouster if Avery answered the 
door bell and let Lou in. Physical removal definitely would be 
an ouster.' Cotenants also must not commit waste of the 
%e Mik v. Cargill, 485 P.2d 229, 232 (Okla. 1971). See also Thompson, supra 
note 4, 8 32.06(a). 
9 For potential ousters in the oil and gas arena, see Anderson & Cuda, supra note 
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property. In other words, one cotenant cannot unreasonably 
interfere with the other's expectations and injure the property. 
Removal of items from the land could be waste but the 
cotenant so removing, despite liability for waste, may gain title 
to the trees or other crops removed.1° In order to end the 
relationship of cotenancy, however, partition is available. 
Partition would separate the property either physically (so 
ownership of separate tracts will be in severalty) or partition 
may ensue by selling the property and dividing the proceeds. 
121 When Cotenant Can Recover for Expenditures 
Made to Benefit Estate 
Not all cotenants will take equal interest in the concurrent 
estate. Presume, however, that neither Avery nor Lou are in 
exclusive possession of the fishing cabin. Avery, nevertheless, 
is a tinkerer and compulsive bill payer. If Avery wants to make 
Lou bear a proportionate share of expenses, the reckoning 
between the managing cotenant and the passive one can arise 
a t  three points of time. The first is during the pendency of the 
cotenancy when Avery might want an immediate contribution 
from Lou. The second possibility arises during a court proceed- 
ing for an accounting of rents and profits. The final time frame 
would be when partition is sought to end the estate. The last 
two scenarios assume that there may be some proceeds to be 
divvied up. 
[a] Property Leased by One Cotenant 
To continue our tale of two owners, without objection from 
Lou, Avery rents the fishing cabin for the season for $2400." 
other cotenant). 
 he Statute of Westminister I1 in 1285 first authorized an action by a cotenant 
alleging waste or seeking partition. (13 Edw. I, 1 Statutes at  Large 196). If a 
defendant was guilty of waste, the defendant could either accept a partition of the 
land or refrain from depleting the land except to the extent other cotenants 
depleted. In essence, the relief was "partition in kind or balancing in kind, a t  the 
election of the defendant." Kuntz, supra note 2, Q 13.03[11 (calling remedy 
incomplete). 
''statute of Anne of 1705 (4 Anne, C. 16 VII, 11 Statutes a t  Large 161) allowed 
for accounting for the profits of renting co-owned property if one party received 
more than a just share or proportion. It, like the Statute of Westminister, was 
incorporated into the common law of the various states. 
Avery had paid the following: $500 for taxes; $1000 on interest 
on the cabin's mortgage; $100 principal on the cabin's mort- 
gage; $50 to unclog a drain; and $75 to install a shower stall. 
In all, Avery spent $1725. Avery might or might not seek 
recompense from Lou. 
Avery's first possibility is an independent action for contribu- 
tion against Lou for half of the costs.12 To evaluate the reme- 
dy's availability, each item must be considered separately. If 
the repair of the drain was necessary, some courts would allow 
such an action if Avery gave notice to Lou of the need, al- 
though other courts seem to demand an agreement between 
the parties before allowing independent contribution for 
repairs. The shower stall presents a different question; if i t  is 
considered an improvement no contribution will lie.13 As for 
the taxes and mortgage payments, some courts will allow an 
independent action if both were liable for the payments. The 
theory for recovery is subrogation; Avery would have paid the 
debts of Lou and might be able to enforce Lou's duties by a 
new lien on the property.14 Avery, however, might not worry 
a t  this point because Avery has the $2400 rent proceeds. 
Naturally, Avery's enriched bank balance might arouse Lou's 
interest. Lou could seek an accounting to go aRer half the 
proceeds, namely $1200.'~ Avery will seek credit for half of 
the expenditures: $250 taxes, $550 mortgage payments, and a t  
least the $25 drain repair. Lou would get the proceeds less 
these expenses. As for the shower stall, Avery would get credit 
if the stall was an improvement that increased the value of the 
fishing cabin. 
12see generally 4 Thompson, supra note 4, § 32.07(b). 
13An exception from the rule of no contribution for improvements is if the 
improvement is necessary to prevent waste. A new roof might be such an  example. 
Shaw & Estes v. Texas Consolidated Oils, 299 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. App. 1957 writ 
refused n.r.e.). 
'*some jurisdictions have modified the tax responsibilities of co-owners. Hence, 
additional payments would be voluntary and not subject to reimbursement. See 
Smith v. Anderson, 57 Cal. Rptr. 774 (1967) (principle that tax payment inures to 
benefit of all cotenants inapplicable if interests separately taxed). 
''see generally 4 Thompson, supra note 4, 8 32.07(c). 
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Some variants on the hypothetical can further clarify the 
relationship of the parties. What if the mortgage interest was 
$2000? Lou would then be liable for an  extra $500. A suit for 
accounting would not be advisable by Lou; Lou would owe 
$125 if Avery sought contribution through a counter claim. 
In this situation, however, Avery might want to seek an 
accounting to clarify obligations and get the extra $125 owed 
by Lou on the books for later reckoning even if Avery could 
not get the money by an independent contribution action. 
As another variant, suppose that Avery transforms the 
fishing cabin into a more winter-proof dwelling and rents it 
to skiers for $300 a week. The total take one season was 
$1200. Avew would not have to account to Lou for these 
proceeds. NO; could Avery directly get the improvement costs 
from Lou.16 
[b] Property Exclusively Used by One Cotenant 
To change the hypothetical, presume Avery made the 
original $1725 worth of expenditures and used the fishing 
cabin each weekend. Lou is in Maine and has no desire to 
use the cabin but, in fact, seeks partition. The effect of Avery 
having exclusive possession varies from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction. Under the majority approach," Avery would 
have no right to any credit for excess expenditures in an  
accounting because Avery's exclusive possession would be 
presumed to offset the increased expenses; the expenses 
would be equivalent to the rental value of the cabin. Under 
a second approach, the cotenant out of possession may prove 
the value of exclusive possession and, in theory, may be owed 
'%he concept behind not allowing contribution for improvements is that no one 
should be forced out of their estate by another voluntarily incurring unneeded costs. 
17 Mastbaum v. Mastbaum, 9 A.2d 51 (N.J. 1939); Barrow v. Barrow, 527 So. 2d 
1373 (Fla. 1988). This approach encourages property use; improvements would be 
made and normally the using cotenant will not owe rent. But even under it, a t  some 
point the non-possessing cotenant may have a right to 112 of the cabin's reasonable 
rental value if that cotenant could prove ouster. Flexible, individual attention to 
when an ouster transpired allows the expectation of the parties to enter the 
equation. For example, if children inherit a house, what they might expect if one 
sibling remains in the house may turn on the type of property, the wealth of each 
sibling, and the siblings' conduct before and after the death of their parents. 
9 20.02[3] MINERAL LAW INSTITUTE 20-10 
rent if half the expenses were less than 112 the rental 
value.'' A second minority approach would enable Avery to 
be recompensed for the excess payments because Lou was 
not formally ousted; Lou retained the right to possession.'g 
According to these jurisdictions, the Statute of Anne only 
requires accounting for third party rents and Avery's actions 
benefitted all concurrent owners. 
[31 How to End the Tenancy-in-Common 
Partition would separate the property either physically (so 
ownership will be in severalty) or partition may take place by 
selling the property and dividing the proceeds. As the Kansas 
court put i t  in Muslow v. Gerber Energy Gorp.? partition is 
"much favored in law because it secures peace, promotes 
industry and enterprise and avoids compelling an unwilling 
person to use their property in common."21 Partition in kind 
is the theoretical first choice so each party could retain 
realty.22 If separation cannot be accomplished evenly, one 
cotenant may make a cash payment known as ~wel ty . '~  
Additionally, if separating the property would lower its overall 
value, courts may order partition by sale, also referred to as 
licitation. 
Often, an accounting accompanies the partition action. The 
majority rule treats improvements made by one cotenant as 
being credited totally to the improving cotenant with one 
caveat: the so-called improvements must have actually 
improved the value of the property.24 Giving the improving 
cotenant the total increase in value may credit that cotenant 
18 Cohen v. Cohen, 106 N.E.2d 77 (Ohio 1952). This may lead to less incentive to 
seek partition and end potential problems. 
I g ~ a i r d  v. Moore, 141 A.2d 324 (N.J. 1958). 
20697 P.2d 1269 (Kan. 1985). 
21~d .  at 1273. 
2 2 ~ e e  generally 4 Thompson, supra note 4, 5 38.04. 
23 Cain v. Christie, 937 P.2d 119 (Okla. Ct. App. 1997). 
24 See generally Cunningham et a l . ,  supra note 4 ,  5 5.12. 
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with more than the tenant's expenditures. If the so-called 
improvements did not increase the value of the property, 
however, the expending cotenant bears their full cost. The 
rationale for giving all the increase in value to the active 
cotenant reflects the fact that often there is no incentive to 
improve common property. The rule therefore encourages risk. 
Assigning the active tenant any loss, however, helps to prevent 
improvident modifications to the property. 
Repairs, however, are generally treated differently in an 
accounting. The expending cotenant is a t  least always given a 
credit. Repairs are deemed somehow necessary; they could 
preserve the estate and prevent waste. Sometimes, however, it 
is difficult to draw the line between repairs and improve- 
ments.== 
[41 Extent of Fiduciary Duties Between Co-Owners 
Cotenants, especially when they receive interests by the same 
deed or transaction, such as a will, are often viewed as 
fiduciaries. These types of concurrent owners owe a high 
degree of care for interests of others. This makes sense in the 
situation of a will, which normally deals with fa mi lie^.'^ I t  is 
less material in the investment si tuati~n.~'  
§ 20.03 Joint Tenancy Contrasted with Tenancy-in- 
Common and Tenancy by Entirety 
Both of the remaining types of concurrent ownership differ 
from tenancy in common in one respect: the concurrent owners 
who hold by joint tenancy and tenancy by the entirety have 
rights of survivorship. In other respects, the joint tenancy acts 
like a tenancy in common hypothetical; a tenancy by the 
entireties, however, has different rules about management of 
the co-owned property. Although later sections of this article 
pay primary attention to mineral development, relevant 
peculiarities of these two forms of concurrent ownership will be 
addressed directly as they are explained. 
"see supra note 13 for the problems of classifying a new roof. 
'%ee Cunningham et al. ,  supra note 4, a t  217-22. 
27 
See 4 20.11, infm. 
[ 11 Joint Tenancy 
[a] Creation 
For joint tenancy, it would be preferable to make the tale one 
of three owners. A typical conveyance that would create a joint 
tenancy would grant to "A, B, and C as joint tenants." Often a 
scrivener will add "with rights of s ~ n i v o r s h i p . " ~ ~  At common 
law, conveyances to "A, B, and C jointly" or simply to "A, B, 
and C" were presumed to create a joint tenancy; tenancy in 
common, however, is the preferred construction of an ambigu- 
ous grant today, but some common law traditions still do 
govern for joint tenancies. Most importantly, four unities mark 
a joint tenancy.29 
At common law, to be joint tenants required four unities to be 
present. The first is the same unity required for a tenancy at  
common: the concurrent owners must have unity of possession. 
Each must have the right to possess the whole. The second 
unity is that of time. The joint tenants must have received 
their interest a t  the same time. The third unity is the unity of 
title: rights must be derived from the same source, be it a deed, 
will or by adverse possession together. The fourth unity is 
referred to as unity of interest. It is presumed that the joint 
tenants have equal undivided shares and their rights must be 
of equal duration, that is, either a leasehold, fee, or life estate. 
Therefore, an initial grant from 0 to A, B, and C as joint 
tenants would be interpreted as A, B, C each owning an 113 
undivided interest in fee as joint tenants. To illustrate how 
survivorship works, if no inter vivos conveyances are made by 
A, B, or C, when A dies then B and C would each own an 112 
undivided interest in fee as joint tenants. On the death of B, C 
would own all the property in fee simple. 
[bl Concept of Severance of Joint Tenancy 
Because of the importance of the four unities to a joint 
tenancy, a joint tenancy is a fragile vehicle. A joint tenancy 
28 In some jurisdictions, such as Texas, the parties must clearly contract for 
survivorship. Tex. Probate Code Ann. !j 46 (1987). Seegenerally Cribbet & Johnson, 
supra note 4, at  106-08 and Cunningham et a!., supra note 4, at  196-98. 
?ice generally 4 Thompson, supra note 4, !j 31.06. 
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may be "severed by the action of one of the joint tenants that 
interferes with the four unities3' To illustrate, return to A, B, 
and C, who are all living joint tenants. Next, presume that A 
conveys A's interest to D. After the conveyance, title will not 
remain the same with D substituted. D cannot be a joint 
tenant with B and C because the unities of time and title are 
not present. 
There could be two possible ways to appraise title a t  this 
point. One alternative would be that A, B, and D each have l/3 
undivided interests as tenants in common. An argument 
against this is that B and C still have all the unities that were 
required to create the joint tenancy. It was only A who 
interfered by the conveyance to D. This analysis leads to the 
correct response. Title to this land is now "blended": B and C 
hold 213 as joint tenants and D owns an  undivided l/3 as a 
tenant in common. If B then dies intestate under a statute 
dictating that all of B's property was to go to H, H would not 
get B's interest in the property. B was a joint tenant and C's 
rights of survivorship would take effect. C and D would then 
be tenants in common, with C having an undivided 213 interest 
and D an undivided l/3 interest. To slightly vary the problem, 
presume B had died and left a will expressly giving the subject 
land to H. The result, nevertheless, would not change. Despite 
the fact that the will showed B had an intent to sever the joint 
tenancy, a will operates as of death and, a t  the instant of 
death, C got B's share. An inter vivos transfer is needed to 
create a severance. 
One inter vivos transfer that raises questions is whether or 
not an oil and gas lease executed by one joint tenant should 
sever the joint tenancy.31 Obviously, if it  does not sever the 
joint tenancy and the leasing joint tenant dies, the oil company 
would have no rights. The preferred view of commentators is 
to consider the lease as severing only the oil and gas estate for 
the life of the lease. The surviving joint tenant would have l/2 
of the oil and gas unburdened by the oil and gas lease and the 
3 0 ~ e e  generally Cunningham et al., supra note 4, 4 5.4. 
31 See 1 Kuntz, supra note 2, 4 5.9 and Ma jorie P. Mosburg, "Effect of Mineral 
Lease On Joint Tenancy," 12 Okla. L. Rev. 302 (1959). 
existing lease would burden the remaining half. At the end of 
the leasehold, the surviving joint tenant would own all the 
minerals and land. One reason commending this solution is the 
nature of property most oRen held in joint tenancy: farms, 
ranches, homes, and investment housing. Laymen favor joint 
tenancy for these types of properties because of the automatic 
nature of the estate. The property goes to the other joint 
tenant a t  death if neither did anything. This avoids probate 
delays, and creditors of the dead person.32 An oil and gas 
lease totally severing the joint tenancy would interfere with 
this fundamental estate planning. 
[c] Partition of Joint Tenancy 
Most statutes directly allow for partition of joint tenancies. 
Even if they do not allow the same directly, because the joint 
tenancy can be severed and a tenancy in common created, 
partition is available to all joint tenants, albeit circuitously.33 
Despite the fact that one of the four unities of a joint tenancy 
is unity of interest, on partition one joint tenant could prove 
that the shares were not equal based on contributions to the 
purchase price or other  intention^.^^ 
[21 Tenancy by the Entirety 
There are differences between joint tenancy and tenancy by 
entirety despite both having rights of survivorship and 
requiring the four unities for creation. A joint tenancy may be 
severed and generally may be partitioned. Anyone may decide 
to be a joint tenant with anyone, but a tenancy by entirety 
requires a husband and wife. Therefore, the estate needs a 
fifth unity, that of marriage. Moreover, with a tenancy by the 
entireties, a conveyance cannot sever the relationship. Further- 
more, neither owner can seek partition. Divorce or conveyance 
from one spouse to the other are the only ways to modify the 
3 %he technique will not avoid estate taxes because property passes because of 
death. The Internal Revenue Service computes the share that goes to the survivor 
based on contributions to its purchase; it does not necessarily presume equal shares. 
Cribbet & Johnson, supra note 4, a t  110. 
%ee generally 4 Thompson, supra note 4, 8 38.03(a). 
=~ezo  v. Jezo, 127 N.W.2d 246, 250, reh'g denied, 129 N.W.2d 195 (Wis. 1964). 
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estate. Currently, only twenty-five states at most recognize the 
estate a t  
There are four models or theories of how a tenancy by the 
entireties can be managed. All four recognize that neither the 
husband nor the wife can defeat the survivorship rights of the 
other.36 The first model, however, would follow the old com- 
mon law and views the husband as the sole manager of the 
property. He can convey the property and his creditors can 
attach his interest, subject to the wife's survivorship rights. A 
second model converts the estate to something resembling a 
tenancy in common with survivorship rights; creditors of either 
spouse may attach their individual debtor's interest. The third 
way of looking a t  the estate is that a conveyance by one spouse 
alone is wholly void and a creditor of one spouse cannot reach 
even that party's interest. The final view is that a creditor of 
an individual spouse could attach its debtor's contingent right 
of survivorship. 
Little caselaw exists on tenancies by the entireties and oil 
and gas. It is presumed states would follow the model they 
adopt in other settings.37 Regardless of the theory of manage- 
ment adopted, however, neither spouse can defeat the right of 
survivorship. Therefore, even if a t  common law the husband 
andlor wife individually could lease, such an oil and gas lease 
would be risky if the leasing spouse dies first. One reported 
case required both spouses to lease.38 Another case, Tyler v. 
B o u ~ h e r : ~  explains the estate in some detail. The court found 
354 Thompson, supra note 4, a t  112 11.85. Included in these are Alaska, Arkansas, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, and Wyoming. Other commentators list fewer states. See 
Cunningham et al., supra note 4, a t  203 n.3. 
36 Seegenerally Ward Terry & Co. v. Hensen, 297 P.2d 213 (Wyo. 1956); Sawado 
v. Endo, 561 P.2d 1291 (Haw. 1977). 
37~ee  1 Kuntz, supra note 2,$5.10; and 2 Williams & Meyers, supra note 2, $502 
a t  576.3 (assumes lack of litigation reflects few disagreements between spouses and 
little productive land is held this way). 
3 8 ~ a d u s  v. Hunter, 228 N.W. 782 (Mich. 1930). rev'd on othergrounds, 256 N.W. 
323 (Mich. 1934). 
39285 S.W.2d 524 (Ark. 1956). See also Hercules v. Jones, 609 A.2d 837 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1992) (if parties owned 112 interest in a joint tenancy as tenants by the 
the husband's sole conveyance gave the husband's rights to the 
grantee. When the husband and wife subsequently conveyed a 
L/2 interest jointly, the grantee received all rights during the 
life of the spouses. Furthermore, because of the husband's 
individual conveyance, the grantee's interest would be indefea- 
sible if the wife died first. However, if the husband died first, 
the wife would get survivorship rights and the grantee and 
wife would be equal tenants in common. 
§ 20.04 Who Can Authorize Use of Oil and Gas 
The following discussion applies to concurrent ownership in 
the form of joint tenancy and tenancy in common.40 A refer- 
ence to "co-owner" will include either type of owner. As noted 
above, co-owners have the undivided right to possess the entire 
estate. Minerals provide a different problem than a fishing 
cabin; to accommodate more cotenants in the cabin simply 
requires extra beds. Minerals, however, are "used" in two ways. 
The first is by actual development. This would consume part 
of the estate and therefore could theoretically be waste. The 
second way to use a mineral estate is through geophysical 
exploration. Geophysical exploration can determine the 
boundaries of the estate's value.41 Two theories have evolved 
to reconcile the relationships between co-owners. 
To continue our tale, different oil companies that believe 
there is some potential in the area now contact Avery and Lou. 
Avery, as we may expect, is more enthusiastic than Lou. What 
rights the co-owners will have to develop or prevent oil and gas 
development are different than those employed to reconcile 
using or renting the fishing cabin itself.42 
entireties, the survivorship mechanisms of both tenancies applied and the survivor 
of the marriage became the joint tenant with the other party). 
%hether or not leasing by one joint tenant severs the estate is immaterial to 
the discussion of whether the leasing or development could take place. The rules for 
tenancy by entirety were briefly discussed in 9 20.03[2], supra. For a review of 
community property rules and other implications of marital rights, see Steven J. 
Hull, "Spousal Joinder Requirements in the Rocky Mountain States," 29 Rocky Mt. 
Min. L. Znst. 545 (1983). 
4'~hillips Petroleum Co. v. Cowden, 241 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1957). 
4 2 ~ o r  treatments of the problems for minerals other than oil and gas, see 
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[I1 Minority Rule: No Co-owner Can Individually 
Develop Minerals 
A unilateral decision to remove part of a jointly owned 
estate has concerned various jurisdictions, partly because it 
intrudes upon common law notions of waste, which require 
co-owners to preserve the co-ow ned estates.43 An oft-cited 
and cogently argued case for the minority position is Law v. 
Heck Oil C O . ~ ~  It  notes that  a mineral interest is real 
property, but the produced minerals are personalty. To the 
West Virginia court, each owner has the right to keep real 
property as real property and an injunction is proper if all do 
not concur in d e v e l ~ ~ m e n t . " ~  The court did acknowledge 
that one co-owner might need to act in the face of potential 
drainage or else literal waste or loss of the estate would 
ensue.46 
The result of the Law case, however, was that  the holder of 
a very small interest could block development by "holding- 
out'' for an  exorbitant sum. In the particular case, the owner 
of an undivided 11768 interest in the oil and gas under the 
Erisman & Dalton, supra note 2, and Bruce E. Cryder & Lynn F. Hendon, 
"Concurrent and Successive Ownership of Coal Property," 11 Eastern Min. L. Inst. 
10-1 (1990). 
Q ~ u r r a y  v. Haverty, 70 111.318 (1873) (interpreting mineral development by one 
cotenant as violating statute authorizing actions against a cotenant who "shall take 
away, destroy, lessen in value or otherwise injure the common propertyn). Loosely 
defined, waste is any action that will diminish the value and enjoyment of the 
property. 
?45 S.E. 601 (W. Va. 1928). 
4 5 ~ h e  other major proponents of the rule are Illinois, Louisiana, and Michigan. 
Zeigler v. Brenneman, 86 N.E. 597 (111. 1908); Campbell v. Homer Ore Co., 16 
N.W.2d 125 (Mich. 1944); GMB Gas Corp. v. Cox, 340 So. 2d 638 (La. Ct. App. 
1976). Louisiana's adoption of the rule is not founded on waste, but on the theory 
that co-owners are owners of the whole and must agree. As between the owner of 
the estate subject to the servitude and the servitude co-owners, however, production 
by one (although unauthorized by the other) interrupts prescription. Coxv. Sanders, 
421 So. 2d 869 (La. 1982). Viiginia may have adopted the rule in a recent 
controversial case. Chosar Corp. v. Owens, 370 S.E.2d 305 (Va. 1988). 
4 6 ~ a w ,  145 S.E. a t  601. See also Paxton v. Benedum-Trees Oil Co., 94 S.E. 472 
(W. Va. 1917) (non-leasing cotenant may permit lessee to continue operations and 
require lessee to account for the co-tenant's proportionate share of royalty). 
131 acre tract demanded $1000. Methods to break the logjam 
that can arise in such jurisdictions include seeking partition, 
attempting to use compulsory pooling statutes, or resorting 
to specific statutory provisions that enable development to go 
forward on the desire of specified amounts of undivided 
 interest^.^' Absent the availability of any statute to assist 
Avery, Lou could block actual oil development unless 
drainage was imminent. Other jurisdictions provide for 
accounting remedies for co-owners such as Lou if Avery 
develops the pr~perty .~ '  
The oil companies might, however, merely want to do 
seismic investigations of Avery and Lou's land. There is less 
precedent dealing with whether one co-owner in a minority 
jurisdiction could unilaterally authorize geophysical explora- 
tion, which is an attribute of a mineral estate.49 Unlike 
development, exploration can be performed multiple 
times5' Nevertheless, unsuccessful exploration could lower 
4 7 ~ e e  generally Ernest E .  Smith, "Methods for Facilitating the Development of Oil 
and Gas Lands Burdened with Outstanding Mineral Interests," 43 Tex. L. Rev. 129 
(1964). The followers of the minority rule with statutory provisions include La. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. 55 31:174 - 31:177 (1988 & Supp. 1997) (majority rule governs if 80% of 
interest owners agree); 765 111. Comp. Stat. Ann. 520/0/01-520/10 (West 1993) 
(owners of majority may seek court order to authorize drilling for the benefit of all); 
and Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 1 319.101 (1984) (similar to Illinois). For an examina- 
tion of compulsory pooling statutes and minority jurisdictions, see Anderson & 
Cuda, supra note 2, a t  16-30 to 16-34, and Smith, supra, a t  138-40. For Louisiana 
law, see Guy E. Wall, "Joint Oil and Gas Operations in Louisiana," 53 La. L. Rev. 
1 (1992). 
48~ampbel l ,  16 N.W.2d a t  125. See generally Anderson & Cuda, supra note 2, a t  
16-25 to 16-30 and 2 Williams & Meyers, supra note 2, 1 504.2. A Michigan case 
also allowed one producing cotenant to obtain the other cotenant's title through 
adverse possession without an ouster of the other cotenant. Thomas v. Rex A. 
Wilcox Trust, 463 N.W.2d 190 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990). Generally, one cotenant cannot 
adversely possess against another without ouster because each has the right to use 
the property. Michigan considers development by one cotenant waste and thus 
adverse. 
49 See Smith v. United Fuel Gas Co., 166 S.E. 533 (W. Va. 1932) (cotenant may 
enter to explore but production would be waste). Louisiana covers geophysical 
operations under its statute, allowing those with 80% interest to proceed. La. Rev. 
Stat. 5 175 (1996) (added by amendment in 1995). 
5 0 ~ f :  Mustang Production Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 754 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1985) (do 
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.* 1; 1 
the speculative value of the property, and potentially injure 
the non-consenting co-~wner.~ '  
[21 Majority Rule: Each Co-owner Can Individually 
Develop Minerals 
If Avery and Lou's land is in a jurisdiction that follows the 
majority rule, each co-owner could develop the minerals 
individually. They would not be liable for waste for produc- 
ing oil or gas.52 The theory behind allowing each co-owner 
to develop is that each co-owner has an  undivided right to 
possess and use the co-owned property. An eloquent expres- 
sion of this concept is found in Prairie Oil & Gas Co. u. 
Allen:53 
Tenants in common are the owners of the substance of the 
estate. They may make such reasonable use of the 
common property a s  is necessary to enjoy the benefit and 
value of such ownership. Since an  estate of a cotenant in 
a mine or oil well can only be enjoyed by removing the 
products thereof, the taking of mineral from a mine and 
the extraction of oil from an oil well are the use and not 
the destruction of the estate. This being true, a tenant in 
common, without the consent of his cotenant, has the 
right to develop and operate the common property for oil 
and gas and for that purpose may drill wells and erect 
necessary plants. He must not, however, exclude his 
cotenant from exercising the same rights and privileg- 
e ~ . ~ ~  
51 Cf. Martel v. Hall Oil Co., 253 P. 862 (Wyo. 1927) (loss of speculative value not 
compensable from trespass) and Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Kishi, 276 S.W. 190 
(Tex. Com. App. 1925) (loss of speculative value is compensable damage from 
trespass). 
'%his does not mean that one cotenant could not be liable for "waste" for actions 
other than simple production. Waste is hard to define, but it includes permanent 
damage to the property from an abandoned well used for salt water disposal. 
Cooperative Refinery Association v. Young, 393 P.2d 537 (Okla. 1964) (operating 
cotenant liable to other cotenants). 
532 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1924) (applying Oklahoma law). 
54~d.  a t  571. As expressed by Martin, supra note 2, a t  13-9: 
In addition to recognizing development as a co-owner's 
appropriate possession, the majority rule recognizes that for 
hydrocarbons, their fugitive character could mean that if co- 
owners must wait for all to concur, minerals could be 
drained.55 An important corollary of the rule that each co- 
owner has the right to develop and sell the oil is that the 
purchaser from the developing cotenant does not convert oil 
owned by another co-owner.56 The rule is followed in Ala- 
bama, Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, 
Pennsylvania, and Texas5' 
There are two constraints on the developing cotenant. First, 
the cotenant cannot exclude the other co-owner from also 
developing.58 Second, the developing co-owner must account 
The "true cotenancy" approach postulates an  ownership right in every molecule 
of gas, and any sale of the gas stream inures to the benefit or detriment of 
every party with an  ownership interest. Failure to account for the value 
realized by a selling party would be keeping money that belongs to others. 
Such an approach must reject the idea that any party has a right to take a 
share in kind because everyone shares an  ownership right in each and every 
molecule. 
Although his definition is correct, industry custom did develop so as to allow 
cotenants to balance in kind if desired. 
55 Burnham v. Hardy Oil Co., 147 S.W. 330 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912), affd, 195 S.W. 
1139 (Tex. 1917). A cotenant, however, does not have a n  affirmative duty to drill 
and protect another cotenant from drainage. Zimmerman v. Texaco, Inc., 409 
S.W.2d 607 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966 error refd, n.r.e.) (involved unleased owner of 1/12 
interest suing lessee of remaining 11/12 interest; unleased owner could drill if 
desired). 
S$ullard v. Broadwell, 588 S.W.2d 398, 400 (Tex. App. 1979) (developing co- 
owner must account). 
"~erhard  v. Stephens, 442 P.2d 692 (Cal. 1968); Marias River Syndicate v. Big 
West Well Co., 38 P.2d 599 (Mont. 1934). For additional cases, see 2 Summers, 
supra note 2, § 472; 1 Kuntz, supra note 2, 5 5.3; and Fife v. Thompson, 708 S.W.2d 
611 (Ark. 1986). 
58 Superior Oil Co. v. Oklahoma Corp. Comm'n, 242 P.2d 454, 456 (Okla. 1952) 
(drilling only well allowable under relevant spacing rules not an ouster). Because 
each co-tenant has the right to develop the  minerals, i t  is difficult for one cotenant 
to clear title by adverse possession. A clear, communicated ouster is needed. Patrick 
J. Carver & Patricia J. Winmill, "Medicine for Ailing Mineral Titles: An Assessment 
of the Impact of Adverse Possession, Statutes of Limitation, and Dormant Mineral 
Acts," 29 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 267, 276-77 (1983). 
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I to the other co-owners and bears the financial risk. The non- consenting co-owner is "carried" for the test well and need not pay for a dry hole out of pocket.59 
Absent a mining partnership, the non-developing co-owner 
is not personally liable for costs. For example, in Sparks 
Brothers Drilling Co. v. Texas Moran Explor. CO.,~' a 114 
interest owner was found only liable to the extent of its 
interest in well, which was operating under a standard Joint 
Operating Agreement (JOA) that denied the creation of a 
partnership. The court found there was no mining partner- 
ship, which requires: (1) a joint interest in the property, (2) 
an  express or implied agreement to share profits and losses, 
and (3) cooperation in the project.61 In Sparks Brothers, 
there was a question as to whether the cotenant participated 
in management. It is clear, however, that cotenancy alone 
does not create a partnership. For a partnership, a communi- 
ty of losses as well as profits is needed.62 If cotenants 
develop pursuant to an agreement, they can, of course, have 
personal liability for costs and each could lien the other 
cotenant's interest.63 
[a] Each Co-owner May Lease for Oil and Gas 
t 
1. One of the primary attributes of the majority rule is that 
each co-owner can lease individually, so Avery could proceed. 
The lease from one co-owner will not bind the non-consenting 
I cotenant, but will be a lease of the consenting co-owners's 
& share. In other words, the lessee steps into the shoes of the 
1 59Krug v. h u g ,  618 P.2d 323, 325-26 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980); Willson v. Superior 
I Oil Co., 274 S.W.2d 947, 950 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) (driller does so at  own risk of a 
5 dry hole). 
f 
"ld. a t  953. For mining partnerships in general, see Shepherd, supra note 2, a t  
$ 234-50 and Erisman & Dalton, supra note 2, a t  7-38 to 7-60. 
I 
t 6 2 ~ e r m e r  v. Donaldson, 18 F.2d 697, 699 (3d Cir. 1927) (agreement allowed co- 
F tenant when notified to participate in expenses and if co-tenant does not do so, even 
if not notified, would only get royalty). See also Krug, 618 P.2d at  325. 
i 
63~i l l  v. Field, 384 F.2d 829, 831 (10th Cir. 1967). 
lessor.64 The lessee is not a trespasser as to the non-leasing 
co-owners but becomes upon entry a tenant in common. As 
will be made more vivid later, the Kansas court correctly 
recognized that while a lease from one co-owner gives legal 
rights, a lease from one co-owner might not be worthwhile 
economically because of the need to account; deductibility of 
expenses will often be an issue and create hazards for the 
developer.65 
The difficulty arises out of a basic premise of the majority 
rule, namely that one co-owner cannot compel another co- 
owner to sign a lease. The Tenth Circuit underscored this 
point when i t  rejected an innovative remedy the district 
court ordered. A co-owner of a term interest claimed that the 
other co-owner was trying to freeze out development until 
the term ended. The district court remedy was to let first one 
party have the option to drill, and then the other. The non- 
consenting party would get a proportionate royalty." The 
Tenth Circuit in Shell Oil Co. v. S e e l i g ~ o n ~ ~  said the reme- 
dy would inappropriately convert a mineral interest to a 
royalty.68 
Another corollary of individual development is that the oil 
and gas lease one co-owner executes is valid between its 
parties, but does not affect the other ~o-owner.~' For exam- 
ple, when some co-owners leased and communitized the 
concurrently owned land with other land, non-leasing co- 
owners had no right to share in proceeds when the produc- 
tion was not from the land in which they owned minerals. To 
64~rairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen, 2 F.2d 566, 572 (8th Cir. 1924). 
65 Brooksv. Mull, 78 P.2d 879 (Kan. 1938). Cf: Gerhard v. Stephens, 442 P.2d 692, 
716 (Cal. 1968) (rationale for non-development that countered abandonment claim 
was that 148 cotenants existed who could not be located). 
"~eel i~son v. Eilers, 131 F. Supp. 639 (D. Kan. 1955). 
67231 F.2d 14 (10th Cir. 1955). 
"ld. a t  18. See also Bemis v. Bemis, 98 P.2d 156 (Kan. 1940) (cannot compel one 
cotenant to sign a lease). 
69~il lson v. Superior Oil Co., 274 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954). 
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share proceeds, the non-leasing co-owners must ratify and 
join the lease and communitization agreement." 
The premise that one co-owner cannot tie another to a lease 
does make i t  appear incongruous that a non-leasing co-owner 
can ratify a lease. Normally, ratification is possible when 
someone could have entered into a contract on another's 
behalf, but a technicality prevented the contract from being 
valid. A co-owner, however, can ratify the act of one who 
could not have previously bound the co-owner's interest. 
Signing of division orders could be a ratification." Other 
forms of ratification may include signing copies of the lease 
and accepting rentals with knowledge of the lease.I2 The 
non-developing co-owner thus has a choice. Generally, a 
proportionate share of net proceeds would be worth more 
than the royalty in a lease proportionately reduced by the 
same fraction, but actual circumstances may lead to different 
results. If a well is not likely to pay out, joining the lease 
and getting an immediate royalty may make more sense 
than remaining entitled to a proportionate share of net 
proceeds. 
[b] Basic Relationship Between Co-Owners When 
One Develops 
To present an  overview of the relationship between co- 
owners when one is developing and one is not and to contin- 
ue to imbue some personality to the discussion, the develop- 
ing co-owner will be Avery, who has leased to an oil company 
named Dudley Do Oil, and Lazy Lou will be the unleased co- 
owner. Again, Prairie Oil & Gas Co., in which the non- 
leasing cotenant held a 1/10 interest, provides the general 
contours of the relationship: 
1 
70~uperior Oil Co. v. Roberts, 398 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. 19661, discussed in Knight, 
supra note 2, a t  234-36. See also Donnan v. Atlantic Richfield, 732 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. 
App. 1987) (cotenant may execute a lease with a pooling clause and need not inform 
other cotenants). 
71 Texas & Pacific Coal & Oil Co. v. Kirtley, 288 S.W. 619,622-23 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1926). 
72 Gulf Refining Co. v. Travis, 30 So. 2d 398 (Miss. 1947). 
Under the general rule . . . [the] Oil Company would be 
bound to account to . . . [Lazy Lou] for one-tenth of the 
net profits determined by deducting from one-tenth of all 
reasonable and legitimate expenses for development and 
operating the property for oil and gas, but in the event of 
loss it could not compel her to reimburse it for any part of 
the loss.73 
Costs could be recovered because Dudley Do Oil Co. was 
neither a willful trespasser nor even a trespasser; therefore 
it could not be treated worse than good faith trespassers, 
who are allowed to deduct costs from proceeds in computing 
damagesT4 To phrase it as one Texas court did, "a cotenant 
who produces minerals from common property without 
having secured the consent of his cotenants is accountable to 
them on the basis of the value of the minerals taken less the 
necessary and reasonable cost of producing and marketing 
the same."75 
The developing co-owner, therefore, cannot keep all pro- 
ceeds, and the duty to account to Lazy Lou arises out of law 
and is not a partnership obligation. Both the accounting duty 
and right to develop are "quasi-contract principles under 
which an obligation may be implied in law to do justice and 
prevent unjust enri~hment."'~ As a quasi-contractual obliga- 
tion, the right to an accounting for the profits of production 
is not a tort remedy for which punitive damages are avail- 
able; even a failure to make bookkeeping entries necessary 
for an accounting does not make failure to pay Lazy Lou a 
conve r s i~n .~~  Additionally, a co-owner must account to other 
73 Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen, 2 F.2d 566, 573 (8th Cir. 1924). 
74 Id. at 573-74; see also Cox v. Davison, 397 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. 1965). 
" K ~ u ~  V. Krug, 618 P.2d 323, 325 Man. Ct. App. 1980). In one instance, the 
Internal Revenue Service treated the proceeds of a suit for accounting as capital 
gains, not royalty. This could indicate that the sums represented diminution of 
value of the property, not ongoing income. Gail v. United States, 58 F.3d 580 (10th 
Cir. 1995). 
%itchell Energy Corp. v. Samson Resources Co., 80 F.3d 976 (5th Cir. 1996). 
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co-owners even if the developer did not mine more than its 
proportionate share or exclude others from mining. This is 
because one co-owner cannot unilaterally partition the proper- 
ty." Moreover, the right to an accounting is personal to the 
cotenant and past accruages do not impliedly transfer with a 
transfer of the cotenancy property absent an express assign- 
ment.'' There is, however, some support for royalty as the 
measure of liability to the non-developer in some situations.'O 
§ 20.05 Basic Contours of Accounting for Oil and Gas i Production I The process of accounting in the oil and gas venue is not dramatically different than the problems Avery and Lou had over their fishing cabin. The value of repairs and improve- 
ments may be questioned either in an  independent account- 
ing or in an accounting appurtenant to a partition. For oil 
and gas, the basic rule is that  net proceeds go to the non- 
1 developing co-owner only after a well pays out; the developer may deduct costs of drilling, producing, and marketing." More specifically, reasonable costs of production include costs of drilling, equipping, and operating a well, repairs and replacement of equipment, and taxes and overhead expenses. 
The basic caveat is the expenses must be proper to produc- 
t i ~ n . ' ~  Moreover, the non-developing co-owner is only due 
E 
i "white v. Smyth, 214 S.W.2d 967, 976 (Tex. 1948) (rock asphalt involved and property differed in mineability). 
I %eiser-~rown Oil Co. v. Samson Resources Co., 966 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1992) (no gas balancing agreement existed). 
I BO McIntosh v. Ropp, 82 A. 949 (Pa. 1912) (life tenant executed lease and - - 
remainderman of V2 interest ratified it; development was not a trespass as  to the 
other remainderman either before or after death of life tenant); Petroleum Explor. 
Corp. v. Hensley, 284 S.W.2d 828, 831 (Ky. 1955) (royalty basis of award to non- 
i leasing co-tenant when the lease provided for a flat royalty and there was no meter on the gas well; damages based on value of production minus costs would be 
speculative because product amount unknown). In Kentucky, a non-consenting co- 
owner only gets a royalty until the co-owner notifies the developer of its interest; 
from that date net profits are the measure of accounting. Gillispie v. Blanton, 282 
S.W. 1061 (Ky. 1926). 
I i " ~ e e k e r  v. Denver Prod. & Ref. Co., 188 P.2d 854 (Okla. 1947). 
I 82~etroleum Explor. Corp. v. Hensley, 284 S.W.2d 828 (Ky. 1955); Burnham v. 
§ 20.05[1] MINERAL LAW INSTITUTE 20-26 
a proportionate share of proceeds and the developing co- 
owner may only recover costs out of proceeds. There is no 
right to an independent action for contribution such as  Avery 
had in the fishing cabin scenario. Oil and gas lien statutes, 
however, depending on their breadth, may assist the develop- 
ing cotenant in recovering the expenses.83 
Although the majority position generally allows a develop- 
ing co-owner to only account for net profits, if the developing 
cotenant actually excluded the other cotenant, then it  is 
possible that the cotenant may not receive a credit for 
expenses. If the wrongful exclusion was in good faith, 
perhaps because of a valid title dispute, accounting for net 
proceeds would still be appropriate.84 If, however, the 
exclusion was in bad faith, the producing cotenant will not 
be able to recover costs.85 
[I] Proof of Proportionate Shares of Proceeds in an 
Accounting 
Both Dudley Do Oil Co. and Lazy Lou may run into 
obstacles in determining the net proceeds due the non- 
developing co-owner. Because of the vagaries of litigation, 
therefore, most instances requiring accounting arise from an  
inadvertent failure to join all interests rather than a pur- 
poseful plan to develop individually. Three major items often 
are disputed: the amount of hydrocarbons produced, the 
Hardy Oil Co., 147 S.W. 330, 334 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912). 
83 John Carey Oil Co. v. W.C.P. Investments, 533 N.E.2d 851 (Ill. 1988) (operator 
of cotenancy property without a lien right granted by agreement may use the 
statutory lien process); accord Amarex v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 772 P.2d 905 
(Okla. 1987); Kenmore Oil Co. v. Delacroix, 316 So. 2d 468, 469 (La. Ct. App. 1975); 
Davis v. Sherman, 86 P.2d 490 (Kan. 1939) (in dicta, oil lien claimed only on a 
fractional interest of a cotenant and not on the entire leasehold partially owned by 
the lien claimant may be allowed). But see Gaudreau v. Smith, 21 P.2d 330 (Kan. 
1933) (one cotenant cannot file lien on entire leasehold in which cotenant has 
interest). See also Fife v. Thompson, 708 S.W.2d 611,611-12 (Ark. 1986) (equitable 
lien rather than statutory lien allowed on one whose interest was 'tantamount to 
co-tenancy" with lienor). 
8 4 ~ e w  Domain Oil & Gas Co. v. McKinney, 221 S.W. 245 (Ky. 1920). 
85 Foster v. Weaver, 12 A. 313 (Pa. 1888); Erisman & Dalton, supra note 2. a t  7-14 
& 7-15. 
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proceeds from sale of the hydrocarbons or their value, and 
the appropriateness of items of expense. This cautions 
against voluntarily developing without concurrence of all or 
most owners. 
From the viewpoint of the developer, the best stratagem is 
to have testimony on expenses indicating that they were 
such as would be incurred by an  ordinarily prudent opera- 
tor." It  is important to remember that the right to an 
accounting for a share of reasonable expenses out of produc- 
tion arises out of cotenancy. Other agreements may not 
modify the rights unless expressly so stated. For example, if 
the non-developing cotenant had also signed an Authoriza- 
tion for Expenditure (AFE), the amount listed in the AFE 
would only limit the non-developing co-owner's exposure if 
the amount was exceeded and the well was a non-producer. 
The AFE affects personal liability, but it  does not limit an  
accounting from proceeds.87 
In the realm of accounting proof, the non-developing co- 
owner does operate a t  a disadvantage because the developer 
controls the bulk of the information. Discovery mechanisms 
may not provide relief if Dudley Do Oil is not the best of 
bookkeepers. Therefore, one court has given those like Lazy 
Lou some leeway; in estimating production for revenue 
accounting, the non-producing cotenant's expert can rely on 
information from a commercial production service, which in 
turn relies on information from the state, which came from 
the operator.88 
[2] Specific Items of Expense Considered 
Court decisions on accounting issues have been sympathetic 
to the developer's actual physical outlays, but have some- 
times balked a t  expenses that could not be proven to have 
been needed or to have benefitted the non-developing co- 
i 
1 = ~ s h l a n d  Oil & Refining Co, v. Bond, 263 S.W.2d 74,76 (Ark. 1953). 
1 "1d. 
i 
! "south Central Petroleum, Inc. v. Long Bros. Oil Co., 974 F.2d 1015, 1018-19 
1. (8th Cir. 1992) (applying Arkansas law). 
-, . 
owner.Bg As an example of the first premise of generosity, 
reasonable compensation for the developer's services and use 
of its machinery and plant have been allowed.g0 Expendi- 
tures for a pumping plant and pipeline also were ap- 
proved.g1 Additionally, courts have recognized that overhead 
is a legitimate charge to the transaction. For example, the 
cost of supervision, which included an ofice and personnel, 
was credited because the developer needed to check on 
contractors and this was the most economical and efficient 
way to do the work.% Insurance is also an allowable 
On the other hand, a clear example of a cost not 
benefitting the non-leasing co-owner would be royalty paid to 
the leasing cotenantSg4 More controversial expenditures 
require additional elucidation. 
First, in assessing reasonableness, courts look to the 
normality of expenses. Sometimes an unusual expense may 
not be allowed, even if i t  was the only way to develop a t  the 
particular time. For example, in order to get equipment and 
a driller during a period of tight availability, the developer 
had to offer an oil payment to avoid black market prices for 
the work. The court disallowed the oil payment as an 
expense and only deducted "actual expenses" for drilling a t  
normal rates.'= 
Moreover, not every undertaking by even a reasonable and 
prudent operator brings forward a clear benefit. One court 
89~ohnson v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 135 P. 589 (Kan. 1913) (burden on operator 
to prove deductible expense). See generally Annotation, "Basis of Computation of 
Cotenant's Accountability for Minerals and Timber Removed from the Property," 5 
A.L.R.2d 1368 (1945). 
%bite v. Smyth, 214 S.W.2d 967, 979 (Tex. 1948) (rock asphalt). 
91 Burnham v. Hardy Oil Co., 147 S.W. 330 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912). 
92~onnette v. Wright, 98 So. 674, 676 (La. 1923); New Domain Oil & Gas Co. v. 
McKinney, 221 S.W. 245 (Ky. 1920). 
"~mither  v. Betts, 264 S.W.2d 255 (Ky. 1954). 
ga~rair ie  Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen, 2 F.2d 566, 574 (8th Cir. 1924). 
% ~ s s l e y  v. Mershon, 262 P.2d 417 (Okla. 1953). 
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1912). 
ain Oil & Gas CO. V. 
rejected charging unsuccessful fracking to the non-consenting 
co-owner from profits of other joint wells, using the premise 
that the developer only gets reimbursed for expenses that 
enhance the property.g6 By analogy to cases dealing with 
conservation commission approved unit expenses, however, 
it is possible that costs for wells that accidently deviated or 
ended up being drilled illegally could be recovered from 
proceeds from other producing wells.97 
In a similar vein, because not every well drilled is a 
producer, the ability to recoup costs of dry holes has been 
controversial. Connette v. Wrightge involved cotenants in a 
leasehold. The first well drilled was a producer. In fact, there 
were multiple producers but some dry holes were also 
drilled. The non-developing cotenant signed division orders. 
The Louisiana court held the cotenant liable for the reason- 
able costs of drilling all wells: 
The execution of the division orders and the receipt of his 
share of the proceeds of all of the oil produced and sold 
was a complete ratification by defendant of the drilling 
operations conducted by plaintiff on the whole property. 
The acquisition of the property jointly as a whole and the 
drilling of wells by plaintiff on all of the leases, the 
benefits of which were availed of by defendant, must be 
considered as  a single enterprise, jointly engaged in by 
the parties.99 
%Knight v. Mitchell, 240 N.E.2d 16, 18 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968). Trackingn seeks to 
increase permeability and hence recovery by fracturing the formation. 
"~ennaco Resources Corp. v. Oklahoma Corp. Comm'n, 831 P.2d 656 (Okla. Ct. 
App. 1992) (parties knew geological conditions were difficult and order contemplated 
need to sidetrack); Wagner & Brown v. Ward Petroleum Corp., 876 F. Supp. 255 
(W.D. Okla. 1994). 
"98 So. 674 (La. 1923). 
99 Id. a t  676; see also Moody v. Wagner, 23 P.2d 633 (Okla. 1933) and Martel v. 
Hunt, 197 So. 402 (La. 1940). Cf. Davis Oil Co. v. Steamboat Petroleum Co., 570 So. 
2d 495 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (dry hole costs billed to non-operator under commission 
authority to consider reasonableness of drilling costs charged a non-operator). 
Other courts have not viewed the dry hole costs as recom- 
pensable from other producing wells. In McMillan v. Pow- ; 
eZZ,'OO the developer sought recompense from other jointly $. 
owned properties, but because there was no agreement to 




Whether or not interest could be charged to the non- 
developing cotenant on the sums expended by the developer 
has been similarly debated, although courts have disallowed 
it. In Cox v. D a v i s ~ n , ' ~ ~  the question of whether the pro- 
ducing cotenant could get interest on money put forward was 
answered in the negative because the non-developing co- 
owner has no personal obligation to pay any part of the cost 
of development. The court found it immaterial whether the 
developer actually borrowed money or not. It did, however, 
recognize some business realities: 
Ordinarily, money will make money and it is probable 
that had the producing cotenants put their money to work 
in some other business undertaking, they probably would 
have realized some returns therefrom. Arguments may be l 
and have been marshalled to support the equitable claim 
of the producer. I t  is he who takes the risk and, if success- \ 
ful, he usually produces financial gain for both himself 1 I 
and his cotenants. However, there is something to be said I 
for the nonjoining cotenant. Actual production of minerals 
is not the only way by which benefits may be obtained 
from the ownership of mineral interests in land. Drilling 
may and often does condemn property for mineral purpos- 
103 es. 
1M) 362 S.W.2d 721 (Ark. 1962). 
lolld. See also Davis v. Sherman, 86 P.2d 490 (Kan. 1939) (no recovery when 
producer was drilled before dry hole); Ashland Oil & Ref. Co. v. Bond, 263 S.W.2d 
74 (Ark. 1953); Katnig v. Johnson, 383 P.2d 195 (Okla. 1963); Burnham v. Hardy 
Oil Co., 147 S.W. 330 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912); and Williamson v. Jones, 27 S.E. 411 
(W. Va. 1897). See generally 2 Williams & Meyers, supra note 2, $ 504.3. 
''397 S.W.2d 200, 201-02 (Tex. 1965). 
lmld. a t  202. See also Essley v. Mershon, 262 P.2d 417 (Okla. 1953) (claim was 
unliquidated before judgment so interest was not a recoverable item of production 
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The court acknowledged the use value of money, but also 
recognized that the non-developing cotenant might have 
chosen to not develop in order to maintain the speculative 
value of the property. The dissent in Cox1" argued that the 
majority misconstrued the issue: "The basis for the settled 
law that the passive cotenant must account to the active one 
upon successful completion of a well, is that  it restores to the 
active cotenant the funds h e  expended in the venture, the 
costs he incurred for the benefit of all cot en ant^."'^^ In its 
view, the recompense due is calculated by looking a t  the 
benefits of the overall venture. This approached the heart of 
the issue: whether accounting should be based on a per well 
I or a per tract basis. 
[3] Accounting Per Well or Per Tract? 
Resolving the question of whether accounting should be per 
well or per tract could solve some of the dilemmas over dry 
t holes and interest charges. Naturally, the developer only 
recovers expenditures out of some proceeds, so there must be 
some successful production. Allowing per tract accounting is 
logical. I t  also promotes development. 
i 
I A co-owner, or the lessee of a co-owner, bears 100% of the risk of the first dry hole. If the first well is successful, the developer will not reap 100% of the proceeds. If the outstand- ing interest is small, less that lo%, the feasibility of proceeding 
I may not alter significantly. Nevertheless, if the outstanding interest is 50%, the prospect would have to improve before drilling. If the developer, however, would be able to recoup the 
1 cost of the dry hole out of later producing wells, the financial 
9) (no recovery when I I 
V. Bond, 263 S.W.2d 
1; Burnham v. Hardy 
v. Jones, 27 S.E. 411 
? 2. 8 504.3. 
la. 1953) (claim was 
e item of production 
picture could change. 
Essentially, a per tract accounting would look a t  all reason- 
able expenditures made to develop jointly owned property 
and marketing expense); Wood Oil Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 268 P.2d 878 (Okla. 
1953) (no interest on operating wst of a well largely on ground that there was no 
evidence operator paid the same or that interest expense was necessary to obtain 
production). 
lW397 S.W.2d at 204. 
lO51d. 
and allow proportionate recovery of expenditures out of 
successes. For some items, such as roads, this procedure has 
the additional advantage of simplicity; a road could be 
needed to drill or service several wells and apportionment 
among wells is difficult. The test for deductibility should be 
whether a reasonable and prudent operator would have 
incurred the costs in a good faith effort to recover oil and 
gas.'06 Even dry holes provide the benefit of geological 
knowledge. 
0 20.06 Relationship of Lessees Leasing From Separate 
Cotenants 
If each co-owner leases to separate oil and gas companies, 
the respective lessees will step into the shoes of their lessors 
and become cotenants. In our hypothetical, Lazy Lou now 
enters the fray and leases to the Lucky But Lazy Oil Compa- 
ny. This company and the Dudley Do Oil Company, however, 
will not jointly own one lease, but each company will be a 
lessee governed by the terms and conditions of the lease its 
co-owner lessor granted. If the two companies enter into an 
operating agreement, which is a contractual arrangement to 
share the risks and costs of drilling, and Dudley Do drills a 
well under that agreement, it  would make the well the 
activity of the Lucky But Lazy Oil Co. so as to preserve its 
lease.'07 If there is no operating agreement, the scenario 
differs. 
In Earp v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp.,'OB one lessee 
drilled a well before delay rental payments were due under 
the lease of the non-developing lessee. The well was a 
'066 Thompson on Real Property, Thomas Edition 256 (David A. Thomas ed., 
1994). Alternatively, the question could be framed as whether it would unjustly 
enrich the non-developing co-tenant to not share the costs. Hemingway, supra note 
2, § 5.1(B). This question subtly differs from the prudent operator standard; a 
search for unjust enrichment employs hindsight and the prudent operator standard 
looks at  the situation a t  the time the development plan is undertaken. 
107~illson v. Superior Oil Co., 274 S.W.2d 947,951-52 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954). For 
a general discussion of an operating agreement, see 2 Williams & Meyers, supra 
note 2, 8 503.2. 
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& Meyers, supra 
producer and two questions arose: first, did the drilling of 
the well forestall the need for rental payments and, second, 
did the well extend the non-developing lessee's lease into the 
secondary term. The court concluded that the act of one 
lessee will satisfy the requirements of the lease of the other 
only if a n  agreement exists between the two le~sees. ' '~ 
Because the parties, however, had construed the delay rental 
requirement as simply requiring the commencement of a well 
on the land, the lease did not end during the primary 
term."' Nevertheless, to enter the secondary term required 
the lessee to produce."' Under Earp, the Lucky But Lazy 
Oil Co.'s lease would have expired after the primary term 
and Lou would be considered an unleased cotenant due an 
accounting directly from the Dudley Do Oil Company. 
The Earp scenario was revisited in a case from North 
Dakota, Schank v. North American Royalties, Inc."' The 
lessee of another cotenant had drilled a well before the 
rental payment date of the second, subject lease. That lessee 
did not participate in the drilling of the well. The court held 
that the well would not meet the unless clause require- 
m e n t ~ . " ~  As the court stated: "Under the terms of these 
contracts, the lessors have every right to look to the lessees 
to carry out these terms by some affirmative action on the 
part of the lessees, not by the refusal on the part of the 
I lessees to participate with the lessee of other fractional 
interests who drills a well on the land."ll4 A lessee must 
i 110 Id. But see Hughes v. Cantwell, 540 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (failure to include "by the lessee" after requirement to pay rentals unless drilling 
was commenced within a year did not mean that lessee could rely on drilling by 
t lessee of a co-tenant). 
"'27 P.2d at 865-66. Accord Mattison v. Trotti, 262 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1959) 
(interpreting Texas law) (well was shut-in and non-developing lessee did not even 
try to pay shut-in royalties). 
112201 N.W.2d 419 (N.D. 1972). 
show more than passive acquiescence in the drilling of wells 
by others. As in Earp, the court founded its rationale on the 
avoidance of speculative holding. An Oklahoma court 
similarly construed Earp: 
The contract being executed for the purpose of procuring 
development upon the premises by the lessee the clause 
should be interpreted to mean that the lessee is required 
to do the drilling and that the act of a third party inde- 
pendent of any co-operation on the part of the lessee is 
not in compliance with the terms of the lease.ll5 
Therefore, the lessee would only meet its lease's require- 
ments by drilling itself or through contracting with another 
to so drill.ll6 The Lucky But Lazy Oil Company lease 
would not have survived. 
Dudley Do Oil Company's situation obviously differs. The 
developing co-owner's lessee indisputably meets the require- 
ments of its lease. The lessee will begin to pay Avery, its 
lessor, royalties immediately upon receipt of proceeds. 
Presuming the lease of the second cotenant is still valid,"' 
the developing lessee will then account to the lessee that is 
not developing. How and when a non-developing lessee such 
as the Lucky But Lazy Oil Co. must pay its lessor is less 
clear. Royalties are due immediately but the non-developing 
lessee, unless i t  has paid costs pursuant to a JOA, gets no 
money until after the well pays out. Some jurisdictions allow 
deferral of royalties with the lessee required to make-up past 
due royalties; all proceeds will go to the lessor until back 
royalties are paid.118 
115 Buckles v. Wil-Mc Oil Corp., 585 P.2d 1360, 1362 (Okla. 19781, quoting Earp, 
27 P.2d at 864. 
116 Id. (lease can be extended by well drilled by a farmee). Some courts have 
looked at whether or not a lease expressly says work must be done by the lessee. 
See 2 Williams & Meyers, supra note 2, 503.1. 
117 For example, in Schank the lessee could have paid delay rentals to preserve 
its lease during the primary term. 
118 Earp. 27 P.2d at 866. See also 1 Kuntz, supra note 2, at 153-55. 
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9 20.07 Relationship of Lessees as Cotenants of One 
Lease 
Another scenario could have arisen from the Avery and Lou 
co-ownership. They could have leased to two oil companies 
under the same lease. This, however, is not a very common 
occurren~e."~ I t  is not uncommon, however, that partial 
working interests are assigned in an  oil and gas lease. There- 
fore, this situation must be addressed. To a certain extent, 
the working interest owners are now cotenants and some of 
the general law of cotenancy applies. The wording of a 
particular lease, assignment, or joint operating agreement, 
however, may provide for differing results. 
With this caveat firmly in mind, each co-owner of the lease 
generally can operate i t  pursuant to the majority rule of 
cotenancy development. For example, in Celsius Energy Co. 
v. Mid America Petroleum Co.,120 a lease gave the lessee 
the right "to unitize the leased premises or any portion or 
portions thereof, . . . with any other lands." An assignee of 
37.5% of the leasehold estate pooled its interest. Production 
occurred off the leased tract. The lessors claimed the pooling 
was unauthorized and the leases terminated. The Tenth 
Circuit held that partial interests may voluntarily pool 
unless language to the negative exists in the lease, which 
was not the case here.''' 
Another aspect of a co-owner's rights was emphasized in 
Bellet v. Grynberg.'22 First, the New Mexico court recog- 
nized that working interest owners without an  operating 
agreement were cotenants. As a result, i t  held the producing 
l lg~very  and Lou could, however, have decided to act in concert and lease to one 
company. In such an instance of joint negotiation, one cotenant could not attempt 
to gain a secret or additional benefit from the oil company. All benefits would have 
to be shared despite the fact that the cotenants are not fiduciaries. Howell v. Bach, 
580 S.W.2d 711 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978). 
'"894 F.2d 1238, 1239 (10th Cir. 1990). 
121 Id. (good faith and a geological basis for pooling were conceded). But see Edwin 
M. Jones Oil Co. v. Pend Oreille Oil & Gas Co., 794 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. App. 1990) 
(cannot pool lessor's working interest in lease). 
'"845 P.2d 784 (N.M. 1992). 
cotenant could be reimbursed for speculative expenditures 
only out of production. As to other necessary and reasonable 
expenditures, the producing cotenant could receive an 
equitable lien on the other party's interest. The court went 
so far as  foreseeing the possibility of a personal judgment 
against the non-operating working interests for these 
necessary ~ 0 s t s . l ~ ~  This, of course, goes beyond normal 
cotenancy rules for recovery. 
§ 20.08 Basic Contours of Partition: A Right or a 
Hardship? 
One way to end the difficulties cotenancy presents for 
development disagreements is  to seek ~ a r t i t i 0 n . l ~ ~  There 
are two types of partition: voluntary and i nvo l~n t a ry . ' ~~  
Voluntary partition is consummated by the parties deeding 
to each other. Involuntary is a creature of courts and 
statutes. 
In voluntary partitions, parties often are more concerned 
about partitioning the surface than the minerals, which can 
create title problems. For example, in Barfield v. Hol- 
land,'* voluntary deeds between co-owners of a large tract 
made the surface of Tracts A, B, and C owned individually, 
but the mineral interests remained in undivided ownership. 
Therefore, the surface and mineral estates were severed. 
When a grantee accepted a deed from each individual 
naming individual tracts, he only received the ownership of 
each individual in the particular tract conveyed, namely the 
respective surfaces and an undivided 1/3 interest in the 
124Another way is to seek a receivership or trustee, discussed in 1 Kuntz, supm 
note 2.1 5.7; Outerbridge, supra note 2, a t  20-46 - 20-56, and Smith, supra note 47, 
a t  142-50. 
'''see Annotation, "Partition ofundivided Interest in Minerals (Including Oil and 
Gas) in Place," 173 A.L.R. 854 and Annotation, "Right to Partition in Kind of 
Mineral or Oil and Gas Land," 143A.L.R. 1092. 
126 844 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. App. 1992). 
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minerals in each tract. The grantee remained a cotenant 
with the remaining mineral owners.12' 
Other items to note about voluntary partitions include that 
they may be rescinded for mutual mistake, but not if only one 
party was mistaken, unless the mistake was known to the 
other party or induced by that party.128 Additionally, the 
concept of voluntary partition does not allow one co-tenant to 
convey a specific part of the property to a third party without 
the concurrence of the other co-owners.129 The other coten- 
ants could, however, ratify the conveyance if desired. Upon 
judicial partition in kind, so called "equitable partition" may 
come in to protect the purchaser by having the specified land 
set over to the conveying cotenant.13' 
Involuntary partition may be obtained by one co-owner 
through petition to the court. General rules applying to 
partition apply to partitions of mineral interests.13' 
111 Majority Views Partition as a Right 
The owner of a concurrent interest in property may not 
desire it  to be partitioned. The co-owner may fear being 
bought out a t  a low price or the loss of future speculative 
earnings. Tax consequences may also influence a desire not 
to change the status quo.132 Nevertheless, in most jurisdic- 
tions, one co-owner's desire for a partition is a right and no 
defenses are a~a i1ab le . l~~  The objecting cotenant cannot 
defeat partition merely by showing a partition would be 
"inconvenient, injurious, or even ruinous to a party in 
27~d. 
12'2apetero v. Canales, 730 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. App. 1987). 
12'see Adams v. Yukon Gold Co., 251 F. 226 (9th Cir. 1918). 
130see 2 Williams & Meyers, supra note 2, 5 507. 
131see Hemingway, supra note 2, 5 3.3; 1 Kuntz, supra note 2, $5 6.1-6.6; 3 
Summers, supra note 2, $5 535-538, and 2 Williams & Meyers, supra note 2,55 506- 
507. 
'"~ee Moseley v. Hearrell, 171 S.W.2d 337, 339 (Tex. 1943). 
13'1d. a t  339 (equity cannot defeat right to partition). 
interest."'" In order to avoid manifest hardship caused by 
trying to divide the indivisible, courts may partition the 
property by sale.135 
[21 Minority Allows Defenses to Partition 
Other jurisdictions allow partition sometimes to be defeated 
on equitable grounds. Oklahoma is one such state. As it has 
explained, there should be no partition if partition would do 
any one of four things, namely: (1) defeat the purposes of the 
property's acquisition, (2) become an instrument of fraud, (3) 
violate testamentary prohibitions on partition which are 
upheld for a reasonable time, or (4) create inequitable 
hardship and oppre~sion. '~~ Oklahoma's solicitude is also 
revealed in a statute that requires a mineral interest owner 
show that co-owners are frustrating the petitioning coten- 
ant's development objectives.13' Nevertheless, the burden 
is on the defendant to show the defense of oppression in 
opposition to partition action.13' In one instance, relief was 
denied because it was not fraud or oppression simply because 
the party objecting to the partition had paid adequate consid- 
eration for the interest and the party seeking partition had 
created the interest. The court also found no encroaching 
development or rapid increase in value or inability of parties 
to purchase a t  sale.13' One state in addition to Oklahoma 
that allows some defenses for fraud or oppression is Kan- 
sas.140 
134~chnitt v. McKellar, 427 S.W.2d 202 (Ark. 1968). 
135 Id. at  209. 
'''Rodkey v. Rees, 527 P.2d 1150 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974). 
13'0kla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1501 (1993). The party seeking partition must also 
show that a compulsory pooling order would not remedy the difficulty. 
lS~enson v. Bryant, 330 P.2d 591, 593 (Okla. 1958). 
lag1d. 
14'see Strait v. Fuller, 334 P.2d 385, 390 (Kan. 1959) (may allege fraud or 
oppression in defense: partition of oil and gas leasehold estates sensitive). Arkansas 
and Mississippi may also take this view. Schnitt v. McKellar, 427 S.W.2d 202 (Ark. 
1968) (alluding to the failure to allege fraud or oppression but possibly referring to 
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[3] Partition in Kind Favored for Minerals 
The general preference is to partition minerals in kind, that 
is, to award minerals in separate acreage.14' The basic 
rationale is that with unknown and highly speculative 
mineral values, a present sale may yield little.'" There- 
fore, it is said that partition in kind of oil and gas rights is 
proper where there has been no development on or near the 
property and there is no reason to believe that any part of 
the property is more or less valuable than any other 
part.'43 If there is known oil and gas value for the proper- 
ty, however, partition in kind would not be appropriate; 
partition by sale would be proper.144 Similarly, if there was 
no way to determine relative values of known mineral lands 
without prohibitive cost, partition should be by sale.'45 An 
accounting will often accompany the partition. A producing 
cotenant will have to make a final accounting for net 
proceeds. This acknowledges that the hydrocarbon produced 
by one cotenant is rightly owned by that ~ 0 t e n a n t . l ~ ~  
Occasionally courts get the opportunity to be creative. For 
example, where surface and minerals were separately owned 
and the property had no proven oil value, and partition in 
kind was impossible because of the diversity of character or 
estates or interests owned, and because some interests were 
need to allege same to determine type of partition); Stern v. Great Southern Land 
Co., 114 So. 739 (Miss. 1927). 
lQ~hillips v. Phillips, 104 N.W.2d 52, 56 (Neb. 1960). 
143~ox v. Lasley, 639 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Okla. 1981) (fact that holder of fractional 
interest in minerals under land also held working interest under oil and gas lease 
to some lands did not destroy right to obtain partition of mineral interest); but see 
Colonial Royalties Co. v. Hinds, 216 P.2d 958 (Okla. 1948) (can partition by sale 
even if no development imminent if too difficult to partition in kind). 
144~ortney v. Tope, 247 N.W. 751,753 (Mich. 1933). 
'%bite v. Smyth, 214 S.W.2d 967, 973 (Tex. 1948). 
146~ee Kuntz, supra note 2, Q 13.03[2] (notes in discussing White v .  Smyth that 
the court did not subtract the value of the removed asphalt from the producing 
cotenant's share of proceeds of a partition by sale). 
only speculative possibilities, the trial court properly ordered 
a sale of surface and minerals separately and distribution of 
proceeds ratably. 14' More intriguingly, when considering 
the alternative of partition in kind, there is some precedent 
for the idea of "checkerboarding." To avoid the possibility of 
one cotenant being luckier in the division, a court has 
suggested not giving each party only one division or allot- 
ment, because many allotments may be the most equitable 
solution given oil's peculiar  characteristic^.'^^ 
P 20.09 Who Can Seek Partition 
Generally, any co-owner not holding by tenancy by the 
entirety may begin the partition process. Nevertheless, there 
are five requirements for par t i t i~n."~ One is that no stat- 
ute either forbids the action or has not been complied 
with.150 For example, normally a partition action would be 
ineffective if all interest owners are not joined.l5l The 
second requirement is that there must be no valid agreement 
to not partition in place among the co-owners. These two 
requirements are relatively straight-forward. 
The last three requirements are more theoretical. First, in 
order to seek partition, the petitioner must have a possessory 
estate. Next, the person seeking partition must own interests 
throughout the area to be partitioned. Finally, the estates to 
be partitioned must be of equal dignity. Equal dignity refers 
to the type or kind of estate, such as a mineral lease as 
147~oker v. Vierson, 41 P.2d 95 (Okla. 1935). 
14'~enderson v. Chesley, 292 S.W. 156,156 (Tex. 1927). The remedy was adopted 
in Phillips v. Phillips, 104 N.W.2d 52 (Neb. 1960). I t  is a more feasible solution with 
a large tract and small number of co-owners than with a smaller tract and more co- 
owners because of spacing requirements for drilling that exist in most states. 
149~emingway, supra note 2, 5 3.3.(B) lists four: joint ownership, possessory 
interest, equal dignity, and ownership throughout the tract. 
'''see Erisman & Dalton, supra note 2, a t  7-20 n.89 (listing partition statutes of 
Western states). 
151 Cf. Mustang Drilling, Inc. v. Cobb, 815 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. App. 1991) (partition 
of a community property estate, not of particular land involved, and therefore was 
effective). 
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, and therefore was 
opposed to a mineral interest. A lessee therefore cannot force 
partition upon its lessor and the owner of the remaining 
undivided mineral interest .Is2 A difference in quantity of 
estate owned does not impact rights to a partition; the owner 
of a VlOO interest may force partition on the remaining 
owners. 
[I] Surface Owners May Seek Partition 
The co-owners of the complete fee, both mineral and 
surface, may obviously seek partition. The co-owners may 
seek to partition both estates or partition the surface without 
disturbing the oil and gas interest other than requiring it  to 
be held jointly by the parties as tenants in ~ornrnon.''~ The 
surface owner may also obtain partition as of right despite 
the presence of an oil and gas lease with wells being operat- 
ed.'" 
[2] Mineral Owners May Partition the Minerals 
Severing minerals creates a separate estate. It  may be 
partitioned even if the parties to the partition have no co- 
ownership of the surface.lS5 Even Louisiana allows parti- 
tion of a mineral servitude, which is Louisiana's analog of a 
mineral estate.'56 More particularly, courts have allowed 
partition of an oil and gas fee, which was classified as an 
interest in real estate.15' Courts have differed on whether 
the presence of a possessory leasehold will foreclose a 
cotenant in the oil and gas estate from seeking partition.'" 
l a ~ e d i n a  Oil Dev. Co. v. Murphy, 233 S.W. 333 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921). See also 
Kolb v. Morgan, 854 S.W.2d 719 (Ark. 1993) (when minerals and surface interests 
are held in different ratios, neither a voluntary nor involuntary partition of the 
surface will be a partition of the minerals) and Hemingway, supra note 2, 5 3.3.(B). 
153 Wilson v. Hartman, 545 P.2d 742 (Okla. 1976). 
lY1~rwin  v. Hines, 121 P.2d 612 (Okla. 1942). 
lsschnitt v. McKellar, 427 S.W.2d 202 (Ark. 1968). 
156~a .  Rev. Stat § 31:172 (1996); see Campbell v. Pasternack Holding Co., 625 So. 
2d 477 (La. 1993). 
157 Holland v. Shaffer, 178 P.2d 235, 241 (Kan. 1947). 
lW3 Summers, supra note 2, § 537. If the lease is possessory, then the mineral 
In Hoffman v. Sohio Petroleum Co.,15' in a jurisdiction 
where a lease was not possessory, mineral owners who 
executed a lease prior to partition could have the minerals 
partitioned, but would only be entitled to oil and gas under 
the land the partition set over to them unless the lease 
contained an entirety clause. 
Additional caveats are raised about partitioning severed 
mineral interests because some courts have been protective 
of surface owners; if they owned the surface and an  undivid- 
ed interest in the minerals, it  was thought that protection of 
the surface might have been one rationale for retaining a 
partial mineral interest. Nevertheless, the minerals can be 
partitioned when one of the mineral cotenants owns the 
surface, but maybe only a t  the petition of the surface owner. 
Earlier cases allowed concerns for surface protection to deny 
partition when sought by one who only owned undivided 
interests in minerals.l6' 
[3] Oil and Gas Lessees May Partition Lease 
Subject to the discussion infra in 3 20.10, oil and gas lease 
working interests generally may be partitioned.l6l For 
example, an operator could get partition when owners of 
undivided interests in oil and gas leases refused to pay their 
share of the expense of further development and operation 
and marketability of the oil was impaired because of clouds 
interest is not, therefore eliminating one of the prerequisites for partition, i.e., that 
the interest be possessory. Similarly, most jurisdictions will not let a future interest 
be partitioned; those that do, require the future interest to be vested, not 
contingent. 
Ia~erteling Bros., Inc. v. Bennett, 287 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Ky. 1956); Dawson 
Daylight Coal Co. v. Beshear, 287 S.W.2d 925 (Ky. 1956) (owners of severed 
minerals could not compel partition that included surface owner with unsevered 
minerals); but see Brand v. Consolidated Coal Co., 76 N.E. 849, 850 (111. 1906) (no 
partition without consent of all cotenants even at petition of surface owner). See 
Annotation, "Right to Partition a's Affected by Severance of Estate in Minerals From 
Estate in Surface by One or More Cotenants," 39 A.L.R. 741 (1925) and Smith, 
supra note 47, at 142. 
' " ~ e  Mik v. Cargill, 485 P.2d 229 (Okla. 1971). 
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on title.162 Kansas, however, was a hold-out on whether an 
oil and gas lease could be partitioned. After early cases 
denied the right to partition an oil and gas lease classified as 
personal property, the Kansas courts allowed partition 
without the need to make special a11egati0ns.l~~ Part  of the 
controversy was whether or not the oil and gas lease was 
possessory, a prerequisite for partition. Oklahoma, which 
views an  oil and gas lease as  incorporeal and non-possessory, 
did not fall into this conceptual trap. Furthermore, in some 
jurisdictions that allow partition of the lease, lessors and 
royalty owners are not necessary parties to an action for 
partition of the lease by the 1 e ~ s e e s . l ~ ~  
[4] Overriding Royalties and Non-Participating 
Royalties Not Subject to Independent Partition 
One of the primary prerequisites for partition makes it 
impossible for royalty interests generally to be partitioned. 
Only possessory interests are subject to partition. As the 
Oklahoma court explained in De Mik v. C ~ r g i l l , ' ~ ~  an 
overriding royalty is not real estate and therefore not subject 
to partition as of right. An overriding royalty only attaches 
to produced oil or gas and its owner has no right to possess 
the realty. Therefore, the royalty owner is not a tenant in 
common with the owners of the mineral fee or of the lease- 
h01d.l~~ 
16'sweeney v. Bay State Oil & Gas Co., 133 P.2d 538 (Okla. 1943). 
lastrait v. Fuller, 334 P.2d 385, 389 (Kan. 1959). Arkansas may still require 
allegations offacts requiring equitable relief. Pasteur v. Niswanger, 290 S.W.2d 852 
(Ark. 1956). 
164 Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Ostrom, 638 S.W.2d 231, 234 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982, 
error refd n.r.e.). But see Celt Oil, Inc. v. Jackson, 469 So. 2d 261 (La. Ct. App. 
1985) (lessors indispensable parties when their lessee seeks partition against their 
cotenant). 
16'485 P.2d 229 (Okla. 1971). 
166~d. at  233-34. See also Muslow v. Gerber Energy Corp., 697 P.2d 1269, 1275 
(Kan. 1985) (em~hasizingneed for possessory interest to seek partition). Other cases 
holding that royalties are not subject to partition include Douglas v. Butcher, 272 
S.W.2d 553 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954, error refd n.r.e.). Therefore, partition would not 
be useful to remove a dormant royalty from land that was rendering i t  unleasable. 
Partition actions, however, may affect royalty interests. If 
the royalty was appurtenant to all the lands to be parti- 
tioned, the royalty can remain attached to the original lands 
and could burden a partition sale.167 Conversely, partition 
will affect a royalty interest granted on one co-owner's 
interest, but that royalty will attach only to those lands 
granted to the specific co-owner in severalty, with an 
increase in size to compensate for the lesser areal ex- 
tent.ls8 
Q 20.10 Enforceability and Identification of 
Agreements Not to Partition 
Because partition is deemed a right, agreements not to 
partition are only enforceable if they are reasonable in 
time.16' With mineral co-owners, especially among those 
who share working interests in leases, whether or not an 
agreement not to partition could be implied from a man- 
agement arrangement is a frequent and important question. 
Courts do not view a simple covenant that one co-owner 
would have exclusive management and control and the other 
would contribute to expenses as  an agreement not to parti- 
tion."' But the existence of a true operating agreement in 
which "parties contract for the drilling of wells and such 
drilling is either made the consideration for the transfer of 
a mineral estate or is necessary to extend or perpetuate a 
Smith, supra note 47, at  141-42. 
16'~elgam Oil Co., Inc. v. Wirt Franklin Petrol. Corp., 209 S.W.2d 376 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1948). 
la2 Williams & Meyers, supra note 2, Q 506.5. See also Annotation, "Right to 
Partition of Overriding Royalty Interest in Oil and Gas Leasehold," 58 A.L.R.3d 
1052. 
16'cf. Roberts v. Jones, 30 N.E.2d 392 (Mass. 1940) (preferential right to 
purchase that would bind subsequent purchasers is an unreasonable restraint on 
alienation and partition). 
'%omarek v. Perrine, 382 P.2d 748, 751-52 (Okla. 1963) (remedy for such a 
breach of management duties is damages; preferential right to purchase clause not 
sufficient waiver). See also Home-Stake Production Co. v. Tri-State Pipe Co., 415 
P.2d 377 (Kan. 1966) and Moseley v. Hearrell, 171 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. 1943) 
(cotenancy and oral agreement for one cotenant to operate not mining partnership). 
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lease, [then] it must be inferred that the parties to the 
drilling agreement did not intend for the estate to be 
partitioned."171 That is, there can be no partition until 
after the contemplated work would be completed.172 
* Provisions of operating agreements other than drilling 
requirements present additional questions. Thomas v. 
Witte173 involved the partitioning of one oil lease of a unitized 
group of oil properties when they were all covered by an 
operating agreement presently in force. The court noted that 
the right to partition is subject to waiver and to estoppel and 
similar equitable defenses.174 The court found that partition 
could not be had without the consent of all the parties if to do 
so would violate the prior agreement. This operating agree- 
ment referred to "joint lands," the need for one operator, and 
had a preferential right to purchase provision. It also stated 
the agreement would not be a partnership, but the agreement 
would run with the joint lands until terminated. The court 
found an implied waiver of the right to partition.175 Obvious- 
ly, express waivers of the right to partition for the time 
necessary and reasonable to perform the joint operations would 
most likely be enforced and are more reliable than seeking an 
implied waiver if one participant seeks partition.176 
Courts have also found waivers of the right to partition in 
situations other than in what resembles a common JOA. For 
example, one cotenant may appropriate special management 
rights. In one such case, a cotenant had an exclusive execu- 
S.W.2d 376 (Tex. Civ. 
nnotation, "Right to 
iehold," 58 A.L.R.3d 
referential right to 
onable restraint on 
:remedy for such a 
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1 337 ( T ~ x .  1943) 
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171 382 P.2d at  751. See also Long v. Hitselberger, 602 S.W.2d 321, 323 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1980) (could partition when drilling completed). 
17'~arner v. Winn, 191 S.W.2d 747 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) (additional covenant 
to manage leases after obligatory wells drilled not a waiver of partition rights). 
17%9 Cal. Rptr. 412 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963). 
1741d. a t  415. 
175 Id. a t  417. See also Sibley v. Hill, 331 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960) 
(preferential right to purchase in joint operating agreement, provision indicating 
desire to continue cotenancy and operational status during life of leases indicated 
absolute right of partition contracted away). 
17'such waivers appear in most JOAs. See Kuntz, supra note 2, 8 13.04[51[al. 
tive right in the form of a power of attorney contained in a 
deed; it was considered a power coupled with an  interest and 
could not be revoked unilaterally by a partition a ~ t i 0 n . l ~ ~  
In  another instance, a grantor reserved an  undivided 1/2 
interest in minerals and the right to designate minerals 
under half of the tract in the event of dispute. The provision 
was held neither to violate the rule against ~ e r ~ e t u i t i e s  nor 
restrain rights of alienation or partition; it was simply a 
contract on how to partition.178 
§ 20.11 Nature of the Relationship Between Mineral 
Cotenants 
A fiduciary is one who has a "duty, created by his undertak- 
ing to act primarily for another's benefit in matters connected 
with the ~ndertaking.""~ Absent a confidential relationship 
with its cotenants or lessors, one cotenant is not a fiduciary of 
the other in the mineral arena.''" Nor is the relationship one 
of principal and agent, whereby one cotenant could bind other 
co-owners in dealings with third ~arties."' 
The results of this status are several. One cotenant need not 
disclose information to another cotenant about the property's 
value.18' Further, one cotenant may purchase the interest of 
the other and it will be considered an  arm's-length dea1.1a3 
177 Odstrcil v. McGlaun, 230 S.W.2d 353, 354 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) (lease issued 
by executive in contravention of power was  void to co-tenant's interest). 
178 Robertson v. Speer, 185 So. 2d 730 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966) 
I 1 79 Black's Law Dictionary 625 (6th ed. 1990). 
I80 Zimmerman v. Texaco, Inc., 409 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). See 
generally 1 Kuntz, supra note 2, 8 5.5. 
181 Earp  v. Mid-Continent Petrol. Corp., 27 P.2d 855, 859 (Okla. 1933); Tungsten 
Products, Inc. v. Kimmel, 105 P.2d 822 (Wash. 1940). 
182 Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Samson Resources Co., 80  F.3d 976 (5th Cir. 1996). 
But see Pure Oil Co. v. Byrnes, 57 N.E.2d 356 (111. 1944) (cotenant with special 
knowledge concerning value of concurrently owned property should reveal same to 
cotenant before cotenant sells to a third party, from whom cotenant then purchases). 
I$ 1 '%'eil v. Shamburg, 27 A. 992 (Pa. 1893). See also Anderson v. T.C. Owen & 
Son, Inc., 97 So. 2d 369 (Miss. 1957) (cotenant may purchase a t  judicial sale if lien 
is only on cotenant's interest). 
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The acquisition of one cotenant's interest by another need not 
be shared with the remaining cotenants.18" However, if one 
cotenant redeems a t  a tax sale or buys out an adverse, hostile 
interest, the remaining cotenants would be able to share upon 
contribution under the theory that the purchasing cotenant 
benefitted the property as a wh01e.l'~ 
In one aspect, however, fiduciary language and rules apply to 
the concurrent relationship. In majority jurisdictions, the 
statute of limitations will not foreclose an acco~n t ing . ' ~  In
minority jurisdictions, however, where one co-owner technically 
cannot produce individually, the statute of limitations would 
impact the time for which the producing cotenant would have 
to account.18' 
Simple property or fiduciary law, however, may not answer 
all questions about the relationship between mineral co- 
owners. The management and development of admittedly co- 
owned property raises issues distinct from ownership of it.lW 
Contractual law may be important in addition to the basic 
property law on accounting and partition. 
§ 20.12 Joint Operation Agreements and Cotenancy 
Joint operating agreements are executed in two settings and 
the setting may dictate whether or not cotenancy rules will 
govern the participants to them. The first setting is when 
l e 4 ~ u t  see Rex Oil Refining, Inc. v. Shirvan, 443 P.2d 82 (Okla. 1967) (cotenant 
to share interest acquired in 80 acres adjoining and unitized with concurrently 
owned property on the theory that it would be inequitable to allow one cotenant to 
get a greatly increased share of 160-acre unit). 
185~yers  v. Parkins, 412 P.2d 136 (Okla. 1965). But see Wilcox Oil Co. v. Schott, 
327 P.2d 471 (Okla. 1958) (non-producing mineral interests are  not separately taxed 
so undivided mineral interest owner may buy a t  tax sale free of other cotenants); 
Smith v. Anderson, 57 Cal. Rptr. 774 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (principle that tax 
payment inures to benefit of all cotenants inapplicable if interests separately taxed). 
l s ~ u d e y  v. Pure Oil Co., 11 P.2d 102 (Okla. 1931); Andrettav. West, 415 S.W.2d 
638 (Tex. 1967). 
1e7~ommers v. Bennett, 69 S.E. 690 (W. Va. 1910) (remedy is one of damages). 
' 5 i d d l e  v. Simmons, 589 So. 2d 89 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (par01 evidence of 
management agreement would not violate statute requiring conveyances of 
immovables to be in writing). 
working interest owners in a specific well or leasehold execute 
a JOA. The second use of a JOA is to govern operation of tracts 
that various oil and gas companies own in severalty. 
In the first situation, working interest owners in a well are 
cotenants and each can market the product and be free of 
conversion liability. The remedy for cotenants seeking share of 
sales (outside of any statute) is an equitable accounting 
between co-owners or court recognition of industry practice in 
the form of balancing in kind.'" Naturally, the terms of the 
JOA can contractually modify these cotenancy rights.1g0 The 
second usage of a JOA, which involves tracts owned in several- 
ty, is more problematical. 
The Oklahoma courts examined it in Tenneco Oil Co. v. 
District Courtlgl and found that a voluntary unitization 
agreement that led to the creation of a unit by the Corporation 
Commission and its order of approval did not create a cotenan- 
cy between the several leaseholders. There was no cross 
conveyance of interests by use of words such as "grant, 
bargain, [or] convey."'92 The court found the JOA to be mere- 
ly a plan to unitize their several tracts for the purpose of 
getting the most recovery, preventing waste, and protecting 
lesi%nderson v. Dyco Petroleum Corp., 782 P.2d 1367, 1371 (Okla. 1989). The 
Anderson case also interprets Teel v. Public Service Co. of Okla., 767 P.2d 391 
(Okla. 1985). According to Anderson's reading of Teel, conversion occurs when: (1) 
co-owning working interest owners have an operating agreement saying one owner 
can market, and (2) the purchaser is aware that  one of the working interest owners 
not a party to a division order has revoked the operator's right to market, and the 
purchaser considers itself buying the non-consenting owner's gas but does not 
account to them. 782 P.2d a t  1371-72. These cases have been criticized as not 
distinguishing true cotenancy from cotenancy-like situations and therefore make 
operating agreements too much like common law cotenancies. See Martin, supra 
note 2, a t  13-16 to 13-19. See also Heiman v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 891 P.2d 1252, 
1257-58 (Okla. 1995) (before statutory remedy, pre-depletion cash-balancing not 
required for each well but could be equitably ordered even if JOA silent). 
''see Penn, supra note 2, 8 18.02[3] (JOAs typically provide procedures for non- 
consent operations, marketing, and accounting procedures; the latter will be 
included whether or not a gas balancing agreement is part of the JOA). 
'"465 P.2d 468, 469-70 (Okla. 1970). 
192~d. a t  470. But see Texas' cross conveyance theory in pooling, discussed in 5 
Summers, supra note 2, 8 956 (might be applicable in other situations). 
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correlative rights. Therefore, no partition was available because 
there was no ~o tenanc~ . ' '~  
In addition to the unavailability of partition in absence of a 
cotenancy, signatories to a JOA also may have no cash 
balancing or accounting rights.''" This is important if parties 
to a JOA have not produced according to their respective 
shares. Generally, there are three ways to bring the underpro- 
duced party into balance:lg5 (1) balancing in kind, which 
normally refers to volume of hydrocarbon produced;'96 (2) 
periodic cash balancing to catch up the underproduced during 
the well's life;lg7 and (3) cash balancing on depletion of the 
reservoir. If no cotenancy is created by a unit agreement, then 
of the three methods, balancing in kind is the preferred 
method of balancing rights.''' Balancing in kind means that 
each party may produce gas, with the understanding that the 
non-producing party's gas is "still in the ground" and the non- 
developer's remedy is to produce. With the preference for 
balancing in kind, a simple inability to market will not suffice 
to order cash balancing when not nearing depletion.'99 There- 
IS31d. See also Martin, supra note 2, a t  13-12 to 13-13 (most JOAs actively reject 
creation of a partnership or cotenancy in the leases but are contracts relating to 
property rights and grant rights to take in kind). 
lW~echnically, a co-owner also does not have cash balancing rights, but rather 
has a right to an accounting for profits. This distinction eliminates some cash 
balancing problems when parties sell a t  different prices. The co-owner is accounted 
to simply on the basis of the overproduced party's receipts minus costs. Kuntz, 
supra note 2, a t  13-24, 5 13.04[5][c]. 
'%one location of such a summary is Beren v. Harper Oil Co., 546 P.2d 1356, 
1359 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976, a s  corrected on limited grant of cert.). 
lg6~rofessor Kuntz has suggested that in times of price fluctuation, courts should 
have the discretion to balance on value of the gas produced, not merely its volume. 
Kuntz, supra note 2, a t  13-23, 5 13.04[5]. 
l g 7 ~ h i s  resembles the right a co-owner has to file periodic accounting suits. 
IgB~oheny v. Wexpro Co., 974 F.2d 130 (10th Cir. 1992). See Martin, supra note 
2, a t  13-29 to 13-33. 
199 Pogo Producing Co. v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 898 F.2d 1064,1067 (5th Cir. 1990). 
See also the discussion in Taylor v. Woodpecker Corp., 562 So. 2d 888 (La. 1990) 
(statute authorizing unit operator to sell gas of unleased interest owners who have 
not otherwise disposed of their gas and obligating the unit owner to pay the 
1 
fore, care should be taken in drawing J O h  to meet the needs 
of market vagaries. 
Often, an express gas balancing agreement is added to a JOA 
to deal with who has what rights to produce and how to 
remedy a situation where one party produces more than the 
other. A gas balancing agreement may be contrasted with 
general cotenancy rules: 
A gas balancing agreement deals with gas volumes, not 
dollars, and prevents a demand for cash balancing on a 
current basis as would be required under the rules of 
cotenancy. However, while cash balancing may be de- 
manded at  any time in the absence of a gas balancing 
agreement, it  is seldom done. When a market is obtained by 
the underproduced party owning 25 percent of the working 
interest, that party is entitled to 25 percent of the produc- 
tion on a current basis. However, there is no rule under the 
laws of cotenancy which permits such party to get into 
balance by requiring that the owners of the other 75 percent 
reduce their current sales to accomplish the balancing.200 
The gas balancing agreement generally addresses the problem 
of how to balance takes and delineates when cash accounting 
will be appropriate.201 In short, the cotenant exchanges the 
right to an immediate share of net proceeds for a right to call 
upon the overproduced party to restrict production. Each 
cotenant, however, still has the theoretical right to produce all 
the hydrocarbons, subject to contractual obligations. 
§ 20.13 Compulsory Units and Cotenancy 
Forced pooling is important in examining concurrent owner- 
ship for two reasons. The first is that it  could remedy some 
problems about development if the statutes allow force pooling 
of undivided interests in tracts, not merely pooling of tracts 
owned in severalty. Most state statutes do allow such compul- 
proceeds to them may be sole remedy). 
2M~enn,  supra note 2, 8 18.03[3]. 
201 Seegenerally Kuntz, supm note 2; Martin, supra note 2; Penn, supra note 2; 
and Smith, supra note 2. 
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sory pooling.202 If the co-owners can make use of these stat- 
utes, the relevant commission would apprise costs and avert 
some of the risks of developing individually. To do so, however, 
will modify the availability of partition as a remedy.203 The 
second question concerning compulsory pooling and cotenancy 
is whether the pooling itself creates a cotenancy with all atten- 
dant common law rights. It generally does not.20" There is, 
however, some analogy to cotenancy in how conservation agen- 
cies manage a compulsory unit. 
Naturally, a conservation commission may unitize and review 
i the reasonableness of drilling costs charged a non-operator. In 
a state where the statute does not specify how the operator 
may collect, a court must proceed according to equity. Louisi- 
ana found that by analogy to cotenancy law, a non-operating 
owner or lessee, who does not consent to operations within a 
compulsory unit, has no liability for costs except out of that 
party's share of proceeds.205 
There are differences between common law cotenancy and 
what a commission may do. E.g., some commissions can apply 
a statutory or discretionary non-consent penalty to a nonpartic- 
ipating interest owner in pooling orders. In Bennion v. ANR 
Production Co.?O6 the Utah Supreme Court found such a 
202~ee Anderson & Cuda, supra note 2, a t  16-14 to 16-18; Outerbridge, supra note 
2, a t  20-16, identified 22 state statutes as expressly covering separately owned 
interests in all or part of the spacing unit: Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, 
Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, 
Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming (current as of 1979). 
2 w ~ s c a r  E. Swan & Joseph E. Hallock, "The Comparisons, Contrasts, and Effects 
of Compulsory Pooling Statutes," 28 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Znst. 911, 916-17 (1983) 
("partition of drilling units into separate smaller tracts would defeat the whole 
purpose of their establishment"). Although the co-owners of tracts within the unit 
might still seek partition, the commission unit would remain. 
2W~chulte  v. Apache Corp., 814 P.2d 469, 471 (Okla. 1991) (forced pooling alone 
does not create a cotenancy). Accord Wakefield v. State, 306 P.2d 305 (Okla. 1957). 
See Martin, supra note 2, a t  13-14 to 13-16. 
205~avis  Oil Co. v. Steamboat Petroleum Co., 583 So. 2d 1139 (La. 1991). 
*%19 P.2d 343 (Utah 1991) (175% non-consent penalty, which meant the non- 
consenting party received no revenues until 175% of the drilling costs were 
penalty constitutional. It  merely adjusts costs and does not \ 
"take" property; the nonparticipating owner still has its t 
mineral interest and a right to royalty. With normal co- ! 
tenancy, the developing cotenant can only recover reasonable 
costs out of proceeds. 1 
Another difference between cotenancy and compulsory pooling ! 
is that a non-consenting party may elect to convert to a royalty I 
interest and an unleased mineral owner is often treated partly 
as a lessor and partly as a working interest owner. In Fife v. 
Th0rn~son,2~~ a case arising in Arkansas, the lessee of the 
owner of 718 of the minerals was found able to develop and 
then was required to account. Interestingly, despite the case 
not being subject to the Oil and Gas Commission rules because 
the discovery was made before January 1,1937, the accounting 
was nevertheless done according to its provisions: that is, costs 
were only charged to 718 of the unleased interest (an undivided 
1/8) and a 118 of Y8 royalty was granted.208 
A final problem in a compulsory unit is how to "balance" 
production; cotenants would simply "account" in cash. In the 
absence of a gas balancing agreement, courts seem to prefer 
balancing in kind unless it  would create waste, preclude an 
owner from recovering the owner's just and equitable share, or 
infringes on the correlative rights of another owner by limiting 
the owner's liberty to enjoy rights or causes damages to 
them.2* Obviously, careful drafting of gas balancing agree- 
ments may be a priority.210 With a totally recalcitrant co- 
recovered). 
m708 S.W.2d 611 (Ark. 1986). 
208~d.  Provisions such as these have been criticized a s  providing a "further 
discouragement to development without all co-owners consent" because the  non- 
consenting owner gets greater benefits than a t  common law. Smith, supra note 47, 
a t  133. 
2 0 9 ~ u n t  Oil Co. v. Batchelor, 644 So. 2d 191 (La. 19941, overruling Hunt Oil Co. 
v. Batchelor, 633 So. 2d 259 (La. Ct. App. 1993). See also Amoco Production Co. v. 
Thompson, 566 So. 2d 138,146 (La. Ct. App. 1990), writ denied, 571 So. 2d 627 (La. 
1990) (cash accounting because of a lack of market a s  ordered by the Commission 
was not arbitrary and capricious). See Martin, supm note 2, a t  13-33 to 13-41. 
2'0~ee 8 20.12, supra, and see generally Kuntz, supm note 2; Martin, supra note 
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owner, however, the availability of commission cost supervision 
and risk penalties may make a compulsory unit advisable for 
the active participant that intends marketing. 
0 20.14 Cotenancy Contrasted with Other Mineral 
Revenue Sharing Devices 
One unity is basic to both a joint tenancy and a tenancy in 
common: each co-owner has a right to possess the total 
property. Therefore, without a concurrent right of possession, 
the cotenancy relationship does not arise.211 Life tenants 
and those holding the remainder, therefore, are not cotenants 
because their rights of possession are not concurrent.212 
Those with no possessory rights generally cannot be coten- 
ants. A right to share in the net profits of the land, such as 
a royalty, does not create a cotenancy with the mineral own- 
er.213 Similarly, jointly holding overriding royalties will not 
create for the holders all the attributes of a cotenancy.214 
There is one exception to the general rule. 
If a party has an interest with all the attributes of a mineral 
estate except for the executive right being held exclusively by 
another, the holder of the undivided interest in the minerals 
will be a cotenant. In Bullard v. Br0adwell,2~~ the owner of a 
non-executive ll3 undivided mineral interest was found to be a 
cotenant and entitled to l/3 of value of mineral minus costs 
when the executive developed directly, rather than leasing. The 
non-executive was not limited to l/3 of the customary royal- 
2; Penn, supra note 2; and Smith, supra note 2. 
211~parks v. Robertson, 203 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947, error refd). See 
generally Knight, supra note 2, a t  227-30. The purported cotenants must have the 
right to possess the same thing. Stoud v. Guffey, 3 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1927), a f d  on othergrounds, 16 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. Corn. App. 1929) (holder ofvalid 
oil lease is not cotenant with holder of valid gas lease). 
212~line v. Henry, 239 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Ct. App. 1951, error refd n.r.e.1. 
213~umberg v. Kumberg, 659 P.2d 823 (Kan. 1983). 
2 1 4 ~ a c ~ o n a l d  v. Follet, 180 S.W.2d 334,337 (Tex. 1944). 
215588 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). 
ty.216 The holding underscores the purpose of a non-executive 
mineral interest: it is to share the proceeds of a mineral estate 
without having the problems of co-owner concurrence in 
development. 
O 20.15 Conclusion 
Multiple ownership of minerals increases the difficulties of 
development. Not only may co-owners be unable to agree on 
development, but the possibility increases that they may be 
unlocatable or subject to a disability that makes them incapable 
of ~ontracting.~~'  The majority of jurisdictions alleviate the 
problem by allowing each co-owner to individually develop. 
Nevertheless, the vagaries of accounting make reliance on 
common law remedies somewhat precarious if substantial 
undivided interests are outstanding. Some statutory devices 
such as compulsory pooling and receivership could assist, but 
they have problems in and of themselves. Therefore, concurrent 
ownership will continue to be a bane of mineral developers. 
216 
Id. at 399. 
217~ee Smith, supra note 47, at 130. 
